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Dear ALEC Member,
Rich States, Poor States should be required reading for governors, legislators, and those who serve them. 
Money is spent more efficiently by the private sector than by governments, so it is reasonable to expect 
that states with lower overall taxes have better economic environments than states with high taxes 
and more government spending. It is true that lowering taxes can be politically difficult: even fiscal 
conservatives start losing their enthusiasm for cutting taxes when special interest groups that consume 
a state’s tax dollars warn them that tax cuts will have dire consequences. But the consequences of being 
caught in a spiral of increased taxes and a decreasing rate of return on the tax base are much more 
dangerous. Arthur Laffer, Stephen Moore, and Jonathan Williams use a clear, concise format to expose 
the scare tactics of the tax-and-spend crowd and show how economic vitality follows lower taxes.  
It is true that the policies of the federal government have a direct effect on the economic environment 
of the entire country, but governors and legislatures are not rudderless. We can and must start to 
change our country’s economic course by providing an environment that rewards our citizens for their 
efforts and their risks. The founders of our country understood that a republic with its multiple states 
was the perfect incubator for vetting competing approaches to public policies. Rich States, Poor States 
illustrates the outcomes of various tax policies at the state level throughout the country. The evidence 
is overwhelming and the proper course is clear: States should pursue policies that leave more money in 
our citizens’ pockets to help fuel and drive our economy. 
I’d like to thank the authors for their contribution to the effort to restore economic prosperity to our 
great country. To those who doubt their research, I encourage you to watch Kansas during the next 
few years as we work to reset the state’s course on taxes and let our citizens once again be the engine 
of economic growth.
Sincerely,
Sam Brownback
Governor of Kansas
Foreword
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Executive Summary
Bloated state spending levels and trillions of dollars in unfunded government employ-ee pension liabilities pose huge financial 
obstacles to economic recovery in the 50 states 
today. This begs the million—or trillion—dollar 
question: Why are some states prospering while 
others are still struggling?
In this fourth edition of Rich States, Poor 
States, Arthur B. Laffer, Stephen Moore, and Jon-
athan Williams discuss the best practices to en-
able states to drive economic growth, create jobs, 
and improve the standard of living for their cit-
izens. The authors also provide the 2011 ALEC-
Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index 
of the states, based on states’ economic policies. 
Through the empirical evidence and analysis con-
tained within these pages, discover which poli-
cies lead to state economic growth and which pol-
icies states should avoid. 
In chapter 1, the authors examine the states’ 
fiscal conditions and discuss the new possibili-
ties for future fiscal reforms. This chapter focus-
es on this year’s top performing states and those 
that continue to struggle. Data from the latest U.S. 
census demonstrates that taxpayers continue to 
vote with their feet by moving to states with more 
competitive business climates. The evidence from 
population changes over the past decade speaks 
for itself. According to the 2010 census, the nine 
states without personal income taxes, which ac-
counted for only 19 percent of the overall popu-
lation at the start of the decade, experienced 35 
percent of all population growth in America. This 
chapter also outlines key threats to states’ finan-
cial health, including unsustainable government 
pension plans and other anti-growth policies.
Chapter 2 surveys recent initiatives for fis-
cal reform in 2010. The authors congratulate 
Washington state voters for resisting an eco-
nomically damaging income tax ballot initiative 
and address how California’s cap-and-trade plan 
promises to damage the state’s economy, while 
doing little to affect greenhouse gas emissions. 
They also analyze more ubiquitous factors influ-
encing state economies, such as escalating health 
care and labor costs.
In chapter 3, a simple roadmap for regaining 
state prosperity highlights the policies best suited 
for creating jobs and sparking economic growth. 
This chapter provides four key guiding principles 
lawmakers and other decision makers should fol-
low to strengthen the economy in their states. 
Finally, chapter 4 is the much anticipated 
2011 ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitive-
ness Index. The index provides two distinctive 
rankings for each state. The first, the Economic 
Performance Rank, is a backward looking mea-
sure based on a state’s income per capita, abso-
lute domestic migration, and nonfarm payroll em-
ployment—each of which is highly influenced by 
state policy. This ranking details states’ individu-
al performances over the past 10 years based on 
the economic data.
The second measure, the Economic Outlook 
Rank, is a forecast based on a state’s current stand-
ing in 15 policy variables, each of which is influ-
enced directly by state lawmakers through the 
legislative process. Generally, states that spend 
less, especially on income transfer programs, and 
states that tax less, particularly on productive ac-
tivities, such as working or investing, experience 
higher growth rates than states that tax and spend 
more.
The following variables are measured in 
the 2011 ALEC-Laffer State Economic Outlook 
ranking:
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Relationship Between Policies and Performance
ALEC-Laffer State Economic Outlook Rank vs. 10-Year Economic Performance, 1999-2009
State Rank
Gross State 
Product Growth
Personal Income 
Growth
Personal Income 
Per Capita Growth
Population 
Growth
net Domestic 
in-Migration as % 
of Population
non-farm 
Payroll Employment 
Growth
2010 
unemployment 
Rate
Utah 1 62.2% 59.8% 35.2% 24.1% 2.0% 11.8% 7.7%
South Dakota 2 61.5% 56.1% 49.9% 7.5% 0.8% 7.3% 4.8%
Virginia 3 55.1% 54.5% 46.2% 11.0% 2.2% 4.4% 6.9%
Wyoming 4 119.8% 81.8% 70.7% 10.2% 4.1% 19.4% 7.0%
Idaho 5 48.2% 53.5% 33.4% 18.9% 7.4% 10.7% 9.3%
Colorado 6 45.9% 43.2% 30.8% 16.1% 4.1% 2.6% 8.9%
North Dakota 7 73.3% 60.6% 69.5% 0.9% -2.9% 12.5% 3.9%
Tennessee 8 36.2% 41.8% 32.7% 10.4% 4.3% -4.3% 9.7%
Missouri 9 30.8% 38.6% 34.2% 6.8% 0.7% -2.9% 9.6%
Florida 10 51.6% 54.8% 40.1% 15.5% 6.9% 3.9% 11.5%
Top 10 Ranked States - 58.5% 54.5% 44.3% 12.1% 3.0% 6.5% 7.9%
Georgia 11 33.6% 42.9% 24.0% 19.4% 5.8% -2.0% 10.2%
Arizona 12 56.9% 61.4% 32.6% 27.7% 11.1% 8.9% 9.9%
Arkansas 13 47.8% 54.4% 48.9% 7.9% 2.6% 0.4% 7.9%
Oklahoma 14 69.0% 55.5% 53.7% 6.7% 1.0% 3.3% 7.1%
Louisiana 15 58.6% 60.5% 63.6% 0.5% -6.8% -1.1% 7.5%
Indiana 16 30.0% 30.6% 28.7% 5.4% -0.4% -7.7% 10.2%
Nevada 17 64.8% 59.2% 23.6% 31.0% 14.2% 12.4% 14.9%
Texas 18 55.7% 60.3% 42.8% 18.3% 3.5% 10.5% 8.2%
Mississippi 19 44.9% 46.2% 45.5% 3.6% -1.2% -5.9% 10.4%
Alabama 20 45.1% 46.8% 43.5% 5.8% 1.8% -3.1% 9.5%
Maryland 21 55.1% 49.3% 47.3% 7.3% -1.7% 3.2% 7.5%
South Carolina 22 36.9% 46.9% 35.8% 13.4% 6.8% -2.2% 11.2%
Iowa 23 46.2% 41.7% 44.4% 2.7% -1.7% -0.5% 6.1%
Massachusetts 24 32.9% 34.7% 39.2% 3.6% -4.9% -3.9% 8.5%
Michigan 25 7.2% 16.9% 21.2% 0.1% -5.6% -16.5% 12.5%
North Carolina 26 41.7% 45.1% 30.4% 16.1% 6.9% 0.3% 10.5%
Kansas 27 44.0% 44.0% 43.0% 4.7% -2.4% -0.6% 7.0%
New Hampshire 28 33.7% 33.6% 34.2% 6.8% 2.3% 1.7% 6.1%
Alaska 29 80.1% 57.5% 50.0% 11.3% -1.1% 15.0% 8.0%
Wisconsin 30 34.6% 35.0% 33.2% 5.2% -0.3% -3.4% 8.3%
West Virginia 31 50.3% 45.7% 50.6% 0.7% 0.9% 0.8% 9.1%
Nebraska 32 47.8% 44.2% 41.5% 4.9% -2.2% 3.6% 4.6%
Washington 33 47.6% 49.1% 36.2% 12.7% 3.5% 4.0% 9.6%
Delaware 34 44.9% 43.7% 35.1% 12.6% 5.2% -1.7% 8.5%
Connecticut 35 34.4% 36.0% 39.6% 3.1% -2.8% -3.8% 9.1%
Montana 36 64.6% 60.2% 55.7% 7.9% 4.0% 10.2% 7.2%
Minnesota 37 36.7% 37.0% 34.6% 6.7% -1.0% -0.9% 7.3%
Ohio 38 22.3% 25.3% 28.1% 1.6% -3.4% -10.7% 10.1%
New Mexico 39 48.0% 61.4% 53.6% 10.4% 1.5% 9.8% 8.4%
Kentucky 40 36.6% 38.7% 38.6% 6.6% 1.9% -2.5% 10.4%
Pennsylvania 41 38.4% 36.9% 40.5% 2.6% -0.4% -1.0% 8.7%
Rhode Island 42 42.0% 40.7% 47.1% 0.2% -4.3% -3.8% 11.6%
Oregon 43 46.2% 40.5% 30.9% 11.5% 4.6% -0.6% 10.8%
Illinois 44 30.9% 33.1% 34.8% 3.8% -5.1% -7.0% 10.3%
New Jersey 45 36.9% 33.5% 39.4% 3.3% -5.3% -1.8% 9.4%
Hawaii 46 58.8% 55.0% 50.7% 6.9% -2.2% 8.6% 6.6%
California 47 43.0% 38.0% 34.7% 8.7% -4.0% -2.3% 12.4%
Maine 48 39.2% 41.3% 44.4% 3.2% 2.0% -0.7% 7.9%
Vermont 49 39.3% 41.8% 46.8% 1.9% -0.5% 0.2% 6.2%
New York 50 40.8% 38.2% 42.6% 2.9% -8.6% -0.5% 8.5%
Lowest 10 Ranked States - 41.6% 39.9% 41.2% 4.5% -2.4% -0.9% 9.2%
u.S. average - 47.0% 46.2% 41.1% 8.6% 0.9% 1.5% 8.8%
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 Highest	Marginal	Personal	Income	Tax	Rate
•	 Highest	Marginal	Corporate	Income	Tax	Rate
•	 Personal	Income	Tax	Progressivity
•	 Property	Tax	Burden
•	 Sales	Tax	Burden
•	 Tax	Burden	from	All	Remaining	Taxes
•	 Estate	Tax/Inheritance	Tax	(Yes	or	No)
•	 Recently	Legislated	Tax	Policy	Changes
•	 Debt	Service	as	a	Share	of	Tax	Revenue
•	 Public	Employees	per	1,000	Residents
•	 Quality	of	State	Legal	System
•	 State	Minimum	Wage
•	 Workers’	Compensation	Costs
•	 Right-to-Work	State	(Yes	or	No)
•	 Tax	or	Expenditure	Limits
This fourth edition of Rich States, Poor States 
provides 50 unique snapshots of state economies 
for your evaluation. Study the rankings and read 
the evidence and you will discover the principles 
for state economic prosperity. 
Enjoy.
State Rank
Gross State 
Product Growth
Personal Income 
Growth
Personal Income 
Per Capita Growth
Population 
Growth
net Domestic 
in-Migration as % 
of Population
non-farm 
Payroll Employment 
Growth
2010 
unemployment 
Rate
Utah 1 62.2% 59.8% 35.2% 24.1% 2.0% 11.8% 7.7%
South Dakota 2 61.5% 56.1% 49.9% 7.5% 0.8% 7.3% 4.8%
Virginia 3 55.1% 54.5% 46.2% 11.0% 2.2% 4.4% 6.9%
Wyoming 4 119.8% 81.8% 70.7% 10.2% 4.1% 19.4% 7.0%
Idaho 5 48.2% 53.5% 33.4% 18.9% 7.4% 10.7% 9.3%
Colorado 6 45.9% 43.2% 30.8% 16.1% 4.1% 2.6% 8.9%
North Dakota 7 73.3% 60.6% 69.5% 0.9% -2.9% 12.5% 3.9%
Tennessee 8 36.2% 41.8% 32.7% 10.4% 4.3% -4.3% 9.7%
Missouri 9 30.8% 38.6% 34.2% 6.8% 0.7% -2.9% 9.6%
Florida 10 51.6% 54.8% 40.1% 15.5% 6.9% 3.9% 11.5%
Top 10 Ranked States - 58.5% 54.5% 44.3% 12.1% 3.0% 6.5% 7.9%
Georgia 11 33.6% 42.9% 24.0% 19.4% 5.8% -2.0% 10.2%
Arizona 12 56.9% 61.4% 32.6% 27.7% 11.1% 8.9% 9.9%
Arkansas 13 47.8% 54.4% 48.9% 7.9% 2.6% 0.4% 7.9%
Oklahoma 14 69.0% 55.5% 53.7% 6.7% 1.0% 3.3% 7.1%
Louisiana 15 58.6% 60.5% 63.6% 0.5% -6.8% -1.1% 7.5%
Indiana 16 30.0% 30.6% 28.7% 5.4% -0.4% -7.7% 10.2%
Nevada 17 64.8% 59.2% 23.6% 31.0% 14.2% 12.4% 14.9%
Texas 18 55.7% 60.3% 42.8% 18.3% 3.5% 10.5% 8.2%
Mississippi 19 44.9% 46.2% 45.5% 3.6% -1.2% -5.9% 10.4%
Alabama 20 45.1% 46.8% 43.5% 5.8% 1.8% -3.1% 9.5%
Maryland 21 55.1% 49.3% 47.3% 7.3% -1.7% 3.2% 7.5%
South Carolina 22 36.9% 46.9% 35.8% 13.4% 6.8% -2.2% 11.2%
Iowa 23 46.2% 41.7% 44.4% 2.7% -1.7% -0.5% 6.1%
Massachusetts 24 32.9% 34.7% 39.2% 3.6% -4.9% -3.9% 8.5%
Michigan 25 7.2% 16.9% 21.2% 0.1% -5.6% -16.5% 12.5%
North Carolina 26 41.7% 45.1% 30.4% 16.1% 6.9% 0.3% 10.5%
Kansas 27 44.0% 44.0% 43.0% 4.7% -2.4% -0.6% 7.0%
New Hampshire 28 33.7% 33.6% 34.2% 6.8% 2.3% 1.7% 6.1%
Alaska 29 80.1% 57.5% 50.0% 11.3% -1.1% 15.0% 8.0%
Wisconsin 30 34.6% 35.0% 33.2% 5.2% -0.3% -3.4% 8.3%
West Virginia 31 50.3% 45.7% 50.6% 0.7% 0.9% 0.8% 9.1%
Nebraska 32 47.8% 44.2% 41.5% 4.9% -2.2% 3.6% 4.6%
Washington 33 47.6% 49.1% 36.2% 12.7% 3.5% 4.0% 9.6%
Delaware 34 44.9% 43.7% 35.1% 12.6% 5.2% -1.7% 8.5%
Connecticut 35 34.4% 36.0% 39.6% 3.1% -2.8% -3.8% 9.1%
Montana 36 64.6% 60.2% 55.7% 7.9% 4.0% 10.2% 7.2%
Minnesota 37 36.7% 37.0% 34.6% 6.7% -1.0% -0.9% 7.3%
Ohio 38 22.3% 25.3% 28.1% 1.6% -3.4% -10.7% 10.1%
New Mexico 39 48.0% 61.4% 53.6% 10.4% 1.5% 9.8% 8.4%
Kentucky 40 36.6% 38.7% 38.6% 6.6% 1.9% -2.5% 10.4%
Pennsylvania 41 38.4% 36.9% 40.5% 2.6% -0.4% -1.0% 8.7%
Rhode Island 42 42.0% 40.7% 47.1% 0.2% -4.3% -3.8% 11.6%
Oregon 43 46.2% 40.5% 30.9% 11.5% 4.6% -0.6% 10.8%
Illinois 44 30.9% 33.1% 34.8% 3.8% -5.1% -7.0% 10.3%
New Jersey 45 36.9% 33.5% 39.4% 3.3% -5.3% -1.8% 9.4%
Hawaii 46 58.8% 55.0% 50.7% 6.9% -2.2% 8.6% 6.6%
California 47 43.0% 38.0% 34.7% 8.7% -4.0% -2.3% 12.4%
Maine 48 39.2% 41.3% 44.4% 3.2% 2.0% -0.7% 7.9%
Vermont 49 39.3% 41.8% 46.8% 1.9% -0.5% 0.2% 6.2%
New York 50 40.8% 38.2% 42.6% 2.9% -8.6% -0.5% 8.5%
Lowest 10 Ranked States - 41.6% 39.9% 41.2% 4.5% -2.4% -0.9% 9.2%
u.S. average - 47.0% 46.2% 41.1% 8.6% 0.9% 1.5% 8.8%
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When you tax something more you get 
less of it, and when you tax something 
less you get more of it.
 
Tax policy is all about reward and punishment. 
Most politicians know instinctively that taxes re-
duce the activity being taxed—even if they do 
not care to admit it. Congress and state lawmak-
ers routinely tax things that they consider “bad” 
to discourage the activity. We reduce, or in some 
cases entirely eliminate, taxes on behavior that 
we want to encourage, such as home buying, go-
ing to college, giving money to charity, and so on. 
By lowering the tax rate in some cases to zero, we 
lower the after tax cost, in the hopes that this will 
lead more people to engage in a desirable activity. 
It is wise to keep taxes on work, savings, and 
investment as low as possible in order not to deter 
people from participating in these activities. 
Individuals work and produce goods and 
services to earn money for present or fu-
ture consumption. 
Workers save, but they do so for the purpose of 
conserving resources so they or their children can 
consume in the future. A corollary to this is that 
people do not work to pay taxes—though some 
politicians seem to think they do.
 
Taxes create a wedge between the cost of 
working and the rewards from working. 
To state this in economic terms, the difference 
between the price paid by people who demand 
goods and services for consumption and the price 
received by people who provide these goods and 
services—the suppliers—is called the wedge. In-
come and other payroll taxes, as well as regula-
tions, restrictions, and government requirements, 
separate the wages employers pay from the wages 
employees receive. If a worker pays 15 percent of 
his income in payroll taxes, 25 percent in federal 
income taxes, and 5 percent in state income taxes, 
his $50,000 wage is reduced to roughly $27,500 
after taxes. The lost $22,500 of income is the tax 
wedge, or approximately 45 percent. As large as 
the wedge seems in this example, it is just part of 
the total wedge. The wedge also includes excise, 
sales, and property taxes, plus an assortment of 
costs, such as the market value of the accountants 
and lawyers hired to maintain compliance with 
government regulations. As the wedge grows, the 
total cost to a firm of employing a person goes 
up, but the net payment received by the person 
goes down. Thus, both the quantity of labor de-
manded and quantity supplied fall to a new, low-
er equilibrium level, and a lower level of economic 
activity ensues. This is why all taxes ultimately af-
fect people’s incentive to work and invest, though 
some taxes clearly have a more detrimental effect 
than others.
10 Golden Rules 
of Effective Taxation
1
2
3
PREFACE
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An increase in tax rates will not lead to 
a dollar-for-dollar increase in tax reve-
nues, and a reduction in tax rates that 
encourages production will lead to less than a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax revenues. 
Lower marginal tax rates reduce the tax wedge 
and lead to an expansion in the production base 
and improved resource allocation. Thus, while 
less tax revenue may be collected per unit of tax 
base, the tax base itself increases. This expansion 
of the tax base will, therefore, offset some (and in 
some cases, all) of the loss in revenues because of 
the now lower rates.
Tax rate changes also affect the amount of tax 
avoidance. It is important to note that legal tax 
avoidance is differentiated throughout this report 
from illegal tax evasion. The higher the margin-
al tax rate, the greater the incentive to reduce tax-
able income. Tax avoidance takes many forms, 
from workers electing to take an improvement in 
nontaxable fringe benefits in lieu of higher gross 
wages to investment in tax shelter programs. 
Business decisions, too, are increasingly based on 
tax considerations as opposed to market efficien-
cy. For example, the incentive to avoid a 40 per-
cent tax, which takes $40 of every $100 earned, 
is twice as high as the incentive to avoid a 20 per-
cent tax, for which a worker forfeits $20 of every 
$100 earned.
An obvious way to avoid paying a tax is to 
eliminate market transactions upon which the 
tax is applied. This can be accomplished through 
vertical integration: Manufacturers can establish 
wholesale outlets; retailers can purchase goods di-
rectly from manufacturers; companies can acquire 
suppliers or distributors. The number of steps re-
mains the same, but fewer and fewer steps involve 
market transactions and thereby avoid the tax. If 
states refrain from applying their sales taxes on 
business-to-business transactions, they will avoid 
the numerous economic distortions caused by tax 
cascading. Michigan, for example, should not tax 
the sale of rubber to a tire company, then tax the 
tire when it is sold to the auto company, then tax 
the sale of the car from the auto company to the 
dealer, then tax the dealer’s sale of the car to the fi-
nal purchaser of the car, or the rubber and wheels 
are taxed multiple times. Additionally, the tax cost 
becomes embedded in the price of the product 
and remains hidden from the consumer.
If tax rates become too high, they may 
lead to a reduction in tax receipts. The 
relationship between tax rates and tax 
receipts has been described by the Laffer Curve.
The Laffer Curve (illustrated below) summarizes 
this phenomenon. We start this curve with the 
undeniable fact that there are two tax rates that 
generate zero tax revenues: a zero tax rate and a 
100 percent tax rate. (Remember Golden Rule #2: 
People don’t work for the privilege of paying tax-
es, so if all their earnings are taken in taxes, they 
do not work, or at least they do not earn income 
the government knows about. And, thus, the gov-
ernment receives no revenues.)
Now, within what is referred to as the “nor-
mal range,” an increase in tax rates will lead to 
an increase in tax revenues. At some point, how-
ever, higher tax rates become counterproductive. 
Above this point, called the “prohibitive range,” 
an increase in tax rates leads to a reduction in tax 
revenues and vice versa. Over the entire range, 
with a tax rate reduction, the revenues collected 
per dollar of tax base falls. This is the arithmetic 
effect. But the number of units in the tax base ex-
pands. Lower tax rates lead to higher levels of per-
sonal income, employment, retail sales, invest-
ment, and general economic activity. This is the 
economic, or incentive, effect. Tax avoidance also 
declines. In the normal range, the arithmetic ef-
fect of a tax rate reduction dominates. In the pro-
hibitive range, the economic effect is dominant.
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Of course, where a state’s tax rate lies along 
the Laffer Curve depends on many factors, in-
cluding tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions. If a 
state with a high employment or payroll tax bor-
ders a state with large population centers along 
that border, businesses will have an incentive to 
shift their operations from inside the jurisdiction 
of the high tax state to the jurisdiction of the low-
tax state.
Economists have observed a clear Laffer Curve 
effect with respect to cigarette taxes. States with 
high tobacco taxes that are located next to states 
with low tobacco taxes have very low retail sales 
of cigarettes relative to the low tax states. Illinois 
smokers buy many cartons of cigarettes when in 
Indiana, and the retail sales of cigarettes in the 
two states show this. 
The more mobile the factors being taxed, 
the larger the response to a change in 
tax rates. The less mobile the factor, the 
smaller the change in the tax base for a given 
change in tax rates. 
Taxes on capital are almost impossible to enforce 
in the 21st century because capital is instantly 
transportable. For example, imagine the behav-
ior of an entrepreneur or corporation that builds a 
factory at a time when profit taxes are low. Once 
the factory is built, the low rate is raised substan-
tially without warning. The owners of the facto-
ry may feel cheated by the tax bait and switch, 
but they probably do not shut the factory down 
because it still earns a positive after tax profit. 
The factory will remain in operation for a time 
even though the rate of return, after tax, has fallen 
sharply. If the factory were to be shut down, the 
after tax return would be zero. After some time 
has passed, when equipment needs servicing, 
the lower rate of return will discourage further 
investment, and the plant will eventually move 
where tax rates are lower.
A study by the American Enterprise Institute 
has found that high corporate income taxes at the 
national level are associated with lower growth in 
wages. Again, it appears a chain reaction occurs 
when corporate taxes get too high. Capital moves 
out of the high tax area, but wages are a function 
of the ratio of capital to labor, so the reduction in 
capital decreases the wage rate. 
The distinction between initial impact and 
burden was perhaps best explained by one of our 
favorite 20th century economists, Nobel winner 
Friedrich A. Hayek, who makes the point as fol-
lows in his classic, The Constitution of Liberty:
The illusion that by some means of progres-
sive taxation the burden can be shifted sub-
stantially onto the shoulders of the wealthy 
has been the chief reason why taxation has in-
creased as fast as it has done and that, under 
the influence of this illusion, the masses have 
come to accept a much heavier load than they 
would have done otherwise. The only major 
result of the policy has been the severe limita-
tion of the incomes that could be earned by the 
most successful and thereby gratification of the 
envy of the less well off.
Raising tax rates on one source of rev-
enue may reduce the tax revenue from 
other sources, while reducing the tax rate 
on one activity may raise the taxes raised from 
other activities.  
For example, an increase in the tax rate on corpo-
rate profits would be expected to lead to a dim-
inution in the amount of corporate activity, and 
hence profits, within the taxing district. That 
alone implies less than a proportionate increase in 
corporate tax revenues. Such a reduction in cor-
porate activity also implies a reduction in employ-
ment and personal income. As a result, person-
al income tax revenues would fall. This decline, 
too, could offset the increase in corporate tax rev-
enues. Conversely, a reduction in corporate tax 
rates may lead to a less than expected loss in rev-
enues and an increase in tax receipts from oth-
er sources. 
An economically efficient tax system 
has a sensible, broad tax base and a low 
tax rate.
 
Ideally, the tax system of a state, city, or coun-
try will distort economic activity only minimal-
ly. High tax rates alter economic behavior. Ronald 
Reagan used to tell the story that he would stop 
making movies during his acting career once he 
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was in the 90 percent tax bracket because the in-
come he received was so low after taxes were tak-
en away. If the tax base is broad, tax rates can be 
kept as low and nonconfiscatory as possible. This 
is one reason we favor a flat tax with minimal de-
ductions and loopholes. It is also why 24 nations 
have now adopted a flat tax.  
Income transfer (welfare) payments also 
create a de facto tax on work and, thus, 
have a high impact on the vitality of a 
state’s economy. 
Unemployment benefits, welfare payments, and 
subsidies all represent a redistribution of income. 
For every transfer recipient, there is an equivalent 
tax payment or future tax liability. Thus, income 
effects cancel. In many instances, these payments 
are given to people only in the absence of work 
or output. Examples include food stamps (income 
tests), Social Security benefits (retirement test), 
agricultural subsidies, and, of course, unemploy-
ment compensation itself. Thus, the wedge on 
work effort is growing at the same time that subsi-
dies for not working are increasing. Transfer pay-
ments represent a tax on production and a sub-
sidy to leisure. Their automatic increase in the 
event of a fall in market income leads to an even 
sharper drop in output.
In some high benefit states, such as Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, and New York, the entire package 
of welfare payments can pay people the equiv-
alent of a $10 per hour job (and let us not for-
get: welfare benefits are not taxed, but wages and 
salaries are). Because these benefits shrink as in-
come levels from work climb, welfare can impose 
very high marginal tax rates (60 percent or more) 
on low-income Americans. And those disincen-
tives to work have a deleterious effect. We found 
a high, statistically significant, negative relation-
ship between the level of benefits in a state and 
the percentage reduction in caseloads.
 In sum, high welfare benefits magnify the tax 
wedge between effort and reward. As such, out-
put is expected to fall as a consequence of making 
benefits from not working more generous. Thus, 
an increase in unemployment benefits is expect-
ed to lead to a rise in unemployment.
Finally, and most important of all for state leg-
islators to remember:
If A and B are two locations, and 
if taxes are raised in B and low-
ered in A, producers and manu-
facturers will have a greater incentive to move 
from B to A.
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Big, maybe even seismic, changes are com-ing to the states and the way they oper-ate from 2011 forward. The tremors from 
the Republican landslide elections in November 
2010 were felt most deeply at the state level, with 
a Republican net pickup of roughly 700 seats in 
the state legislatures around the country. There 
are now nearly 30 newly elected governors—from 
New Mexico to Ohio to Maine—most of whom en-
tered office with a new governing philosophy ori-
ented toward free markets, limited government, 
lower tax rates, and business-friendly policies. 
Rick Scott, the new governor of Florida, rep-
resents this new governing philosophy as well as 
anyone. He is new to public office and disparag-
ing of life-long politicians. He says, “we are go-
ing to make Florida a pro-business and pro-com-
petitive state, so when a firm looks to operate in 
North America, they think of Florida first.” He 
says he admires Rick Perry’s success in Texas 
and Chris Christie’s achievements in New Jersey. 
“We are going to learn what Texas and New Jer-
sey have done, and in Florida, we are going to do 
it better.”1 
He is going to have to compete against other 
newcomers with an agenda for change. That long 
list of reformers includes Scott Walker of Wiscon-
sin, John Kasich of Ohio, Robert Bentley of Ala-
bama, Mary Fallin of Oklahoma, and Sam Brown-
back of Kansas. Even New York Democrat Andrew 
Cuomo is talking about protecting taxpayers, tak-
ing on the public sector unions, streamlining gov-
ernment services, and fixing schools.
The State of State Finances
The other big story of 2011 will be how states deal 
with continued budget deficits, which are large-
ly a result of two decades of fiscal profligacy.2 
Of course, some on the Left would like to blame 
strictly a shortage of tax revenue for the budget 
gaps in the states. However, there are two sides 
of the fiscal coin, and it is clear a vast majority of 
states set themselves up to fail by spending be-
yond their means and hoping the market will 
keep up with their spending sprees. According to 
the Mercatus Center at George Mason Universi-
ty, “Rapid growth in per capita spending, a lack 
of economic freedom, and weak balanced budget 
rules caused the (budget) gaps. The recession just 
exposed these underlying problems.”3 The study, 
which analyzes two decades of state budget data, 
suggests—all other factors being equal—that 
states spending the most over the period had bud-
get gaps nearly 20 percent greater than the most 
austere states.4 From 1985 to 2005, most state 
budgets doubled, and some tripled, in size.5 In the 
past decade alone, state and local budgets grew 
90 percent faster than the private sector’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).6  
Again, the academic statistics back up what we 
all know is the key to good budgeting: the ability 
to say no. Furthermore, the American people un-
derstand this growth in spending simply is not 
sustainable. When asked what to blame for cur-
rent budget problems, an overwhelming 75 per-
cent of Americans say politicians’ unwillingness 
to cut spending.7  
States will have to fend for themselves finan-
cially this year: Almost all of the fiscal stimulus 
money from 2008–2009 has already been spent, 
and the new Republican majority in the U.S. 
House of Representatives is unlikely to appropri-
ate more bailout dollars for state budgets. States 
that took federal stimulus money also agreed to 
“maintenance of effort” provisions, which prohib-
it them from downsizing many programs going 
The State of the States
www.alec.org        3
THE STATE OF THE STATES
forward, compounding the problem. This is why 
the 2010 edition of this publication warned states 
that federal “free” stimulus money would be a 
curse, not a blessing.8 That prognosis has turned 
out to be correct—to the detriment of state law-
makers working toward real budget reform. In the 
end, Milton Friedman had it right: With govern-
ment, there is no such thing as a free lunch.
The good news is that states may finally get a 
respite from the dismal fiscal picture of the last 
two years. State tax revenues began to pick up in 
late 2010 and are looking strong in early 2011, 
thanks in part to the extension of the Bush tax 
cuts at the federal level, which should help spur 
economic growth, and lessen the risk of a double-
dip recession.9 Researchers at the Rockefeller In-
stitute of Government report that revenue was up 
4.5 percent in the third quarter of 2010.10 Even 
more encouraging is that preliminary numbers 
show stronger revenue growth from the first part 
of 2011. According to the Rockefeller Institute, 
“several important indicators suggest broad state 
fiscal conditions remain fragile. These include the 
record revenue declines during the Great Reces-
sion, continued upward trends in state spending, 
and unemployment rates that remain nearly dou-
ble their pre-recession levels, to name a few.”11  In-
deed, it will take many more quarters of positive 
revenue growth to return to fiscal stability. Ac-
cording to a 2010 Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) study, the state and local government 
sector will face a $9.9 trillion budget gap over the 
next few decades.12 
One solution many governors, including 
Chris Christie of New Jersey, Rick Perry of Texas, 
and Bob McDonnell of Virginia, have implement-
ed is to reset budget baselines to 2007 levels to 
reflect the “new normal” of mediocre revenue col-
lections.13 We think nearly every state will need a 
budget reset back to 2007 or 2008 levels to avoid 
permanent deficits. 
Wisconsin Exposes Deeper State Budget Crisis
In the wake of the recent protests in Wisconsin 
and several other states, Americans are taking a 
much closer look at the grim budget realities fac-
ing our states today. Wisconsin governor Scott 
Walker correctly points out that his state’s cur-
rent budget trajectory is unsustainable, and he is 
not alone.
The financial state of the states is not encour-
aging. Driven by irresponsible state and local 
spending growth, which have steadily outpaced 
private sector growth over the past decade, cur-
rent budget deficits are estimated to exceed $100 
billion in the upcoming fiscal year.
As bad as they are, these budget gaps are over-
shadowed in size and scope by unfunded liabili-
ties in state pension and health care systems for 
public employees, which are trillions of dollars 
in the red.14 These are unsustainable cost drivers 
that threaten the financial solvency of the states. 
Without fundamental pension reform, expect the 
news stories discussing the possibility of state 
bankruptcy to continue.15 
As liberal former California Speaker Willie 
Brown recently put it, “At some point, someone is 
going to have to get honest about the fact that 80 
percent of the state, county, and city budget defi-
cits are due to employee costs. Either we do some-
thing about it at the ballot box, or a judge will do 
something about it in bankruptcy court.”16 
The problem is that most of the legislative 
“fixes” over the past few years for state budgets 
To gain control of a state budget, the following questions should be answered:
What is the role of government?
What are the essential services the government must provide to fulfill its purpose?
How will we know if government is doing a good job?
What should all of this cost?
When cuts must be made, how will they be properly prioritized?
Steps to a Priority-Based Budget
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have merely kicked the can down the road, post-
poning or obscuring problems rather than solving 
them.17 That has to end, and, as Speaker Brown 
suggests, everything has to be on the table, in-
cluding a review of public employee pay and 
benefits.
ALEC just released its State Budget Reform 
Toolkit to help in this effort, providing state leg-
islators with more than 20 recommendations for 
modernizing state budgets, improving budget 
transparency, controlling costs, and improving 
government efficiency.18 By setting clear priori-
ties and getting their public employee costs under 
control, states can show they are able to live with-
in their means, just like taxpayers do. 
States need innovative budgeting strategies 
to address these new economic challenges with-
out resorting to economically damaging tax in-
creases; they must move toward building prior-
ity-based budgets. In 2003, a bipartisan group of 
legislators in Washington state, along with Dem-
ocrat Gov. Gary Locke, successfully implement-
ed priority-based budgeting to eliminate a budget 
deficit of more than $2 billion.19 
Only by carefully considering the proper role 
of government can legislators and governors ef-
fectively protect individual rights while providing 
essential services to taxpayers in an efficient, cost-
effective manner. Great savings can be achieved if 
legislators and agencies focus on the core func-
tions of government instead of wasting time de-
termining how a nonessential function can be 
better performed. Despite the economic difficul-
ties facing the states, there is a pathway to budget 
reform and financial sustainability.
America’s Protected Class
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the 
U.S. Department of Labor, as of December 2010, 
state and local government employees not only 
earned more in wages than their private sector 
counterparts, but they also received benefits 69 
percent higher than those in the private sector.20 
If states could grow money on trees, it would be 
grand for politicians to hand out Cadillac bene-
fit plans to all workers, but in a world of limit-
ed resources, states must choose between needs 
and wants. 
Years ago, the private sector transitioned away 
from the defined-benefit model of pensions for 
its workers because it could not sustain the costs 
and be profitable. Today, it is estimated that only 
21 percent of private sector employers offer a de-
fined-benefit pension.21 In contrast, in the pro-
tected class of state and local government employ-
ment, approximately 84 percent of employees still 
receive a defined-benefit pension, and in some 
cases, the employees do not contribute a dollar 
themselves.22 This unsustainable defined-benefit 
model has resulted in a financial catastrophe for 
state taxpayers. As The Wall Street Journal’s Dan-
iel Henninger put it, “Americans, staring at fis-
cal crevasses opening across Europe, have to de-
cide if they also wish to spend the next 50 years 
laboring mainly to produce tax revenue to pay for 
public workers’ pensions and other public prom-
ises. The private sector would exist for the pub-
lic sector.”23 As Maryland delegate Melony Griffith 
(who, according to Project Vote Smart, was previ-
ously rated 100 percent supportive by the Mary-
land teachers’ union) said, “It’s no surprise that 
people would like to have a more beneficial pack-
age, but quite honestly we can’t afford it.”24 
Our friends at State Budget Solutions have 
put together a valuable chart outlining the vari-
ous estimates of unfunded pension liabilities by 
state. As shown in Table 1 on the following page, 
the estimates range from a low $450 billion from 
the PEW Center for the States to nearly $3 trillion 
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State PEW Study aEI Study novy-Marx and Rauh Study
Alabama $9,228,918,000 $43,544,880,000 $40,400,000,000 
Alaska $3,522,661,000 $14,192,229,000 $9,300,000,000 
Arizona $7,871,120,000 $45,004,090,000 $48,700,000,000 
Arkansas $2,752,546,000 $20,026,314,000 $15,800,000,000 
California $59,492,498,000 $398,490,573,000 $370,100,000,000 
Colorado $16,813,048,000 $71,387,842,000 $57,400,000,000 
Connecticut $15,858,500,000 $48,515,241,000 $4,900,000,000 
Delaware $129,359,000 $5,688,663,000 $5,100,000,000 
Florida ($1,798,789,000)* $98,505,110,000 $8,980,000,000 
Georgia $6,384,903,000 $58,742,784,000 $57,000,000,000 
Hawaii $5,168,108,000 $18,533,398,000 $16,100,000,000 
Idaho $772,200,000 $10,022,613,000 $7,900,000,000 
Illinois $54,383,939,000 $192,458,660,000 $167,300,000,000 
Indiana $9,825,830,000 $33,756,655,000 $30,200,000,000 
Iowa $2,694,794,000 $21,266,226,000 $17,000,000,000 
Kansas $8,279,168,000 $21,827,991,000 $20,100,000,000 
Kentucky $12,328,429,000 $47,016,382,000 $42,300,000,000 
Louisiana $11,658,734,000 $43,797,899,000 $36,400,000,000 
Maine $2,782,173,000 $13,227,289,000 $11,800,000,000 
Maryland $10,926,099,000 $48,199,258,000 $43,500,000,000 
Massachusetts $21,759,452,000 $60,476,274,000 $54,200,000,000 
Michigan $11,514,600,000 $72,187,197,000 $63,600,000,000 
Minnesota $10,771,507,000 $59,354,330,000 $55,100,000,000 
Mississippi $7,971,277,000 $32,225,716,000 $28,700,000,000 
Missouri $9,025,293,000 $56,760,147,000 $42,100,000,000 
Montana $1,549,503,000 $8,633,301,000 $7,100,000,000 
Nebraska $754,748,000 $7,438,589,000 $6,100,000,000 
Nevada $7,281,752,000 $33,529,346,000 $17,500,000,000 
New Hampshire $2,522,175,000 $10,233,796,000 $8,200,000,000 
New Jersey $34,434,055,000 $144,869,687,000 $124,000,000,000 
New Mexico $4,519,887,000 $27,875,180,000 $23,900,000,000 
New York ($10,428,000,000) $182,350,104,000 $132,900,000,000 
North Carolina $504,760,000 $48,898,412,000 $37,800,000,000 
North Dakota $546,500,000 $4,099,053,000 $3,600,000,000 
Ohio $19,502,065,000 $187,793,480,000 $166,700,000,000 
Oklahoma $13,172,407,000 $33,647,372,000 $30,100,000,000 
Oregon $10,739,000,000 $42,203,565,000 $37,800,000,000 
Pennsylvania $13,724,480,000 $114,144,897,000 $100,200,000,000 
Rhode Island $4,353,892,000 $15,005,840,000 $13,900,000,000 
South Carolina $12,052,684,000 $36,268,910,000 $43,200,000,000 
South Dakota $182,870,000 $5,982,103,000 $4,700,000,000 
Tennessee $1,602,802,000 $30,546,099,000 $23,200,000,000 
Texas $13,781,228,000 $180,720,642,000 $142,300,000,000 
Utah $3,611,399,000 $18,626,024,000 $16,500,000,000 
Vermont $461,551,000 $3,602,752,000 $3,300,000,000 
Virginia $10,723,000,000 $53,783,973,000 $48,300,000,000 
Washington ($179,100,000) $51,807,902,000 $42,900,000,000 
West Virginia $4,968,709,000 $14,378,914,000 $11,100,000,000 
Wisconsin $252,600,000 $62,691,675,000 $56,200,000,000 
Wyoming $1,444,353,000 $6,628,204,000 $5,400,000,000 
Total u.S. $452,195,687,000 $2,860,967,583,000 $2,485,800,000,000 
Table 1  |  State unfunded Pension Liabilities   Source: State Budget Solutions
*Parenthesis indicates surplus in state pension funds. Please reference endnote 25.
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from the American Enterprise Institute.25 We be-
lieve the accurate estimate is much closer to the 
$3 trillion figure.
Critics of real pension reform might suggest 
that pension systems can grow their way out of 
their unfunded liabilities. For that to be the case 
requires making the most optimistic assumptions 
and assumes future politicians will not continue 
the age-old process of raiding pension funds for 
general fund use. If executives in the private sec-
tor tried that approach, federal authorities would 
have a home waiting for them in a place like Leav-
enworth, Kan. 
Many official estimates of the size and scope of 
state and local government employee pension lia-
bilities are miles from reality. Here are a few ma-
jor reasons we are bearish on the ability of states 
to escape the pension crisis without fundamen-
tal reform.
Warren Buffett recently said states are being far 
too rosy in their expectations of the future market 
performance for their assets. Unbelievably, some 
states still assume an average rate of return of 8-9 
percent.26 Don’t we all wish we could simply as-
sume such rates of return? Mr. Buffett, the “Oracle 
of Omaha,” says states should use a much more 
conservative assumed future growth rate to accu-
rately value their pension liabilities in this era of 
new market realities.27 Bill Gates Jr., who spent 
the last year studying the issue, has observed that 
states must rethink their pension systems and do 
away with their pension “gimmicks.” 28 
The other major reason state and local pension 
funds are in precarious financial shape is due to 
the devastating market losses pension funds suf-
fered during the 2008 financial crisis. Many funds, 
driven into riskier and riskier investment choices 
by attempting to meet the unrealistic rates of re-
turn mentioned above, lost 25 to nearly 30 per-
cent of their entire assets in 2008. The city of De-
troit gambled on risky investment choices like an 
airline company that has undergone three bank-
ruptcies and a luxury Detroit hotel. According to 
a recent news report, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is currently investigating the city.29 
In many cases, these losses have not yet ful-
ly been accounted for in official unfunded liabil-
ity estimates. You may be surprised to know that 
states can use “flexible” guidelines of the Gov-
ernmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), 
which allow them to “smooth” the 2008 pension-
fund losses for 5–8 years in some cases. This 
means we are only starting to begin to realize the 
dramatic losses from 2008. Those who say states 
will easily be able to make up these losses better 
hope for market returns able to beat Warren Buf-
fett’s projections over the next 30 years. 
For the reasons outlined, we think the more 
bearish estimates of unfunded pension fund li-
abilities in Table 1 are probably closest to the 
truth. As the old saying goes “whenever govern-
ment says a problem is bad, the reality is almost 
always worse.” Some on the Left may continue to 
deny that pension funds face a funding crisis, but 
states should beware; they ignore this debt tsuna-
mi at their own peril.
Pension Reform Gains Momentum 
In response to mounting unfunded liabilities, 
many states are increasingly considering replacing 
their defined-benefit pension plans with 401(k)-
style defined-contribution plans for new employ-
ees.30 ALEC member Senator Dan Liljenquist of 
Utah spearheaded a major pension reform that is 
undoubtedly one of the most important legislative 
accomplishments on fiscal reform anywhere in 
America in recent years. According to Sen. Liljen-
quist’s congressional testimony:
Utah closed its defined-benefit pension 
plans to new enrollees, creating a new re-
tirement system for new employees hired 
after July 1, 2011. Under Utah’s new re-
tirement system, public employees will re-
ceive a defined employer contribution to-
wards retirement. New public employees 
will be able to choose between (1) a 401(k) 
style program, or (2) a hybrid pension pro-
gram (where they may pool market risk 
with other employees). Regardless of the 
program employees choose, Utah will only 
contribute at a set amount towards retire-
ment. Utah’s recent pension reforms will, 
over time, reduce and eliminate Utah’s 
pension related bankruptcy risk. This is a 
big win for Utah taxpayers.31 
We could not agree more, and we hope many 
other states will follow Utah’s lead and protect 
taxpayers from being forced to pick up the tab for 
the massive unfunded liabilities in many grossly 
neglected public pension funds. 
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State Competitiveness 
America’s new governors and state lawmakers 
seem to understand what we have been saying in 
this report for years: State policies matter in terms 
of which states prosper and which states fall be-
hind in the race for jobs and economic growth. 
The policy blunders that hurt growth prospects 
the most are high income tax rates, forced union 
work rules, heavy regulation, an excessive state 
workforce, unfunded public pensions and health 
plans, poorly performing schools, and a litigation 
system that invites expensive and frivolous law-
suits. Two new policy mistakes, now in vogue in 
many state capitals that will cost their states jobs 
and make their citizens poorer, should be add-
ed to this list. The first is state based cap-and-
trade taxes to address climate change. Regard-
less of what one thinks about global warming, it 
does not make sense for a state to unilaterally dis-
arm its economic competitiveness through such a 
tax regime. State cap-and-trade laws—California 
has the most onerous—do not reduce global car-
bon emissions. They simply move factories out of 
a state, or out of the country, to places that do not 
have cap-and-trade laws.
The second reckless policy is setting a state 
renewable energy standard. The evidence is clear 
that policies requiring a state to get 20 percent, or 
even 33 percent, of its electricity from so-called 
“green energy” only increase electricity prices sub-
stantially for families and businesses in the state. 
California’s renewable energy requirement is fore-
cast to cost state electric users roughly $12 bil-
lion in the short term—money taxpayers in this 
economically debilitated state cannot possibly af-
ford right now.32 The wrongheadedness of renew-
able energy laws is compounded by the fact that 
reliance on wind power, as Colorado has discov-
ered, fails to reduce carbon emissions much, if at 
all. Wind is such an unreliable source of electrici-
ty that coal plants are required to operate around 
the clock as a backup for wind power.33  
The False Promise of Green Jobs
A new study finds that 140 major business-
es moved out of the Golden State in 2010, three 
times the pace of outmigration in 2009.34 Things 
will not get any better for a while in California, 
thanks to a new voter approved law to impose a 
cap-and-trade climate change regime on the state’s 
utilities and industries. This state is already untold 
billions of dollars in debt. We retell the story so 
others can avoid this dose of economic cyanide.
From the 1950s through the 1990s, California 
was a golden land of economic opportunity, but 
no more. In 2007, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger 
signed the law AB 32, which he said would propel 
California into an economy expanding, green job 
future. Well, a new study by the state’s own audit-
ing agency burst that green bubble.
The study, released May 13, 2010, concludes 
that “California’s economy at large will likely be 
adversely affected in the near term by implement-
ing climate related policies that are not adopted 
elsewhere.” While the long term economic costs 
are “unknown,” the study finds that AB 32 will 
raise energy prices, “causing the prices of goods 
and services to rise; lowering business profits; and 
reducing production, income and jobs.”35 That is 
pretty straightforward. 
The economic reality here is what the Legis-
lative Analyst’s Office calls “economic leakage.” 
That is jargon for businesses and jobs that will 
“locate or relocate outside the state of Califor-
nia where regulatory related costs are lower.” The 
study says the negative impact on most Califor-
nia industries will be “modest,” but energy inten-
sive industries—specifically, aluminum, chem-
icals, forest products, oil, gas, and steel—“may 
significantly reduce their business activity in Cal-
ifornia.”36 The prediction was fairly accurate. Yes, 
some new “green jobs” will be created, but the 
“net economy wide impact,” it says, “will in all 
likelihood be negative.”37 
Enough Californian voters either ignored the 
report or shrugged and decided such costs are 
worth it to save the planet from CO
2
. But the re-
port bursts that bubble too, concluding that the 
California law’s impact on carbon emissions will 
be de minimis because “the economic activity that 
is shifted will also generate” greenhouse gasses 
outside the state. Recognizing this problem, Cali-
fornia politicians are busy trying to get a Western 
regional pact to reduce carbon emissions, but so 
far Arizona, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Wash-
ington have refused. They would rather have the 
jobs. 
We hope they do not get suckered into this 
policy. It should be obvious to state legislators 
that similar job and business “leakage” will strike 
the United States in general if cap-and-trade pass-
es in their state. The hardest hit industries will 
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leave cap-and-trade states and relocate to the likes 
of China and India where marginal costs are low-
er. States that want to stop outsourcing need to 
avoid taxing their own industries. 
Sadly, California has joined the ranks of the 
“has been” states, and its outmigration problem 
has only gotten worse in the past years. Despite all 
of its natural geographical advantages—ports of 
entry to the Pacific region, balmy weather, relax-
ing beaches, idyllic mountains, and as the Beach 
Boys sang, those gorgeous “California Girls”—
years of redistributionist economic policies have 
resulted in more U.S. residents leaving California 
than arriving there. As we will go into more de-
tail later in this chapter, the decline of Califor-
nia is probably the best evidence we can present 
to show the impact of poor policy decisions on a 
state’s economic pulse. 
Cheerful News from the States 
Fortunately, not all news is bad in the states this 
year. Despite persistent budget shortfalls caused 
by overspending, many states are taking steps to 
become more competitive for business and job 
growth. We continue to anticipate which state will 
be the first to eliminate its income tax since Alas-
ka eliminated its income tax several decades ago. 
There are states that have the political alignment 
to get this done, and we would not be surprised 
if one of the southern states—perhaps South Car-
olina, Georgia, or Alabama—phased out their 
state income tax. Also, as outlined in last year’s 
“Missouri Compromise” chapter of this publi-
cation, the Show-Me State is seriously consider-
ing joining the ranks of the no income tax states, 
largely in the quest to become a growth state for 
jobs.38 Whichever state eliminates its income tax 
first will send a blaring message to the rest of the 
country: Our state is open for business. 
Among pro-growth tax reform proposals so 
far in 2011:
• Though Missouri has not yet repealed its 
income tax, Show-Me State lawmakers just 
repealed the state’s anti-business franchise 
tax, and Gov. Jay Nixon, a Democrat, signed 
this legislation (SB 19) into law. “Once ful-
ly phased out, SB 19 will save Missouri em-
ployers more than $80 million annually, 
money that employers can instead invest in 
expanding businesses and creating jobs and 
opportunity for working Missourians,” said 
Daniel P. Mehan, Missouri Chamber president 
and CEO.39 
• Rep. Ed Garner introduced a bill that effective-
ly would have eliminated the capital gains tax 
on new investment in Arkansas. After passing 
the Democrat controlled Arkansas House of 
Representatives, the bill unfortunately died on 
a voice vote in a Senate committee.40 The Ar-
kansas Department of Finance and Adminis-
tration, the state’s revenue scoring agency, al-
most laughably scored the legislation as a huge 
revenue loss and then officially testified in op-
position to this pro-growth legislation that 
would have made Arkansas more competitive. 
What a shame, not to mention a lost oppor-
tunity to make Arkansas a more prosperous 
state. This sort of taxpayer funded lobbying 
needs to be discontinued in short order.
• You can add Oklahoma to the list of states 
considering eliminating its income tax. “We’re 
going to have to do something drastic to move 
the state forward,” State Rep. David Dank said. 
“We would be able to recruit more industry, 
get more productive people in here making 
money, spending money and it would really 
be a benefit to our economy.”41 The Oklaho-
ma Senate took that pro-growth idea a step 
further and actually passed the legislation to 
eliminate the state’s income tax.42 
• Hoping to keep pace with their neighbors 
to the south, legislators in Kansas recent-
ly passed important pro-growth legislation 
that would automatically phase down person-
al and corporate income tax rates. Under the 
proposal—the March to Economic Growth 
Act—which passed the House but stalled in 
the Senate, taxpayers would enjoy reduced in-
come tax rates on personal and corporate tax-
es when state revenue grows. “It would begin 
the process of Kansas becoming a pro-growth 
state,” Rep. Richard Carlson, Chairman of the 
House Taxation Committee, said.43 
• North Dakota lawmakers are sparring with 
Gov. Jack Dalrymple and rejected his tax relief 
proposal—because it was not large enough! As 
it turns out, the Legislature’s plan would slash 
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personal income tax rates by 20 percent and 
reduce corporate tax rates by 10 percent.44 
• The Iowa House passed a 20 percent across 
the board tax reduction on the personal in-
come tax.45 As Majority Leader Linda Upmey-
er said, “This bill will allow employers to put 
Iowans back to work, inject millions of dollars 
into Iowa’s economy and get our state moving 
forward again.”46 
• The Arizona Legislature recently approved a 
significant cut to their corporate tax rate as 
well. After signing the bill, which will reduce 
the state’s corporate rate from nearly 7 percent 
to 4.9 percent, Gov. Jan Brewer said, “I’m not 
willing to stand aside and just wait until the 
Arizona economy recovers.”47
• Michigan Governor Rick Snyder has pro-
posed, and the Legislature has approved, a 
plan to enhance his state’s competitiveness 
by eliminating the onerous Michigan Busi-
ness Tax. This tax has been a noose around 
the neck of Michigan’s economic recovery 
since it replaced another barrier to growth—
Michigan’s burdensome Single Business Tax—
less than five years ago.48 The Wolverine State 
should be first in line for policies to increase 
competitiveness after losing a decade’s worth 
of growth under Jennifer Granholm’s tax hap-
py administration.
• Lawmakers in the Hoosier State voted to re-
duce their corporate income tax from 8.5 per-
cent to 6.5 percent. State Rep. Eric Turner de-
scribed the necessity of making Indiana more 
competitive through this tax relief. “It creates 
sticker shock when companies are looking at 
Indiana,” he said. “This is the jobs bill—not 
corporate welfare.”49  
• In Florida, Gov. Rick Scott crafted “Florida’s 
first jobs budget,” which reduces state spend-
ing by $4.6 billion and cuts taxes by $3.6 bil-
lion.50  Under his plan, the Sunshine State 
would completely eliminate its corporate in-
come tax by 2018. The governor is laser fo-
cused on job creation; he is looking to ful-
fill his promise to create 700,000 jobs in that 
time frame. As Robert McClure, president of 
the James Madison Institute in Tallahassee, 
put it, Gov. Scott’s budget gives “an opportu-
nity for American ingenuity and the free mar-
ket to flourish.”51
Some dedicated class warriors will angrily at-
tack proponents of these business friendly, pro-
growth tax measures. However, as we have said 
for years, businesses do not pay taxes, people 
do, and economists from all parts of the politi-
cal spectrum agree. Don’t take our word for it—
even the left leaning Tax Policy Center Blog re-
cently admitted that states need to rid themselves 
of corporate income taxes: “State corporate in-
come taxes are lineal descendents of the federal 
version and share many of its flaws. They doubly 
tax income at the firm and individual level, penal-
ize businesses that organize as corporations, and 
reward debt versus equity finance. They also are 
very sensitive to the business cycle, and tend to 
plunge when the economy sags.”52 Well said.
Our guess is that many other states will be 
following a competitiveness agenda as the reve-
nue picture starts to improve. State corporate in-
come taxes are low hanging fruit for tax reform-
ers looking to make a bold statement and declare 
their states open for business. 
The Wealth of States: 
People (and Businesses) Vote with their Feet
We have argued in these reports that American 
workers, families, and businesses are repelled by 
high taxes, overspending, and excessive regula-
tion. Still, many policymakers and pundits re-
main unconvinced. We have all heard the flawed 
arguments: people and businesses do not change 
their behavior in response to government poli-
cy. No matter how high the taxes or how oner-
ous the regulations, people will simply grin and 
bear whatever weights government places on their 
shoulders. 
Now we have powerful confirmation of the 
impact that bad state economic policies have on 
the vitality of states. This confirmation comes 
from one of the most unimpeachable of sources: 
the U.S. census. The new 2010 census data tracks 
population trends among the 50 states. These 
numbers tell us a significant amount of informa-
tion about which states and regions are prosper-
ing and which are suffering from economic de-
cline. This new data confirms an unmistakable 
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migration pattern over the past decade: the higher 
the taxes and the tighter the government choke-
hold on a state economy, the more likely people 
are to pack up their bags and leave—or for those 
outside the state, to stay away. For the states who 
have continued to neglect competitiveness over 
this decade, the 2010 census results show that it 
is time for them to pay the piper for their anti-
growth policymaking.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the big winners over 
the past decade are clear: Texas and Florida were 
the only two states to gain multiple new congres-
sional seats. However, with an incredible gain of 
four seats in the last 10 years, Texas had twice 
the population gain of Florida and certainly has a 
legitimate claim to bragging rights for its excep-
tional performance. On the other side of the equa-
tion, only two states lost more than one congres-
sional seat: Both high tax New York and Ohio will 
each have two fewer members of Congress and 
two fewer electoral votes as a result. 
America’s New Rust Belt: The Northeast 
America’s Rust Belt region, which used to be con-
fined mostly to the liberal upper Midwest, now 
extends to virtually every state in the Northeast. 
With the exception of Delaware, every one of the 
20 states north of the Mason-Dixon Line from 
Minnesota to Maine had below average popula-
tion growth.53 The Northeast is looking more like 
Top Winners Population Change
Top Marginal 
Personal Income Tax 
Rate
2000-2009 average 
State/Local 
Tax Burden (%)
2000-2009 average 
State/Local 
Tax Burden ($)
Nevada 35.10% 0.00% 7.37% $3,078.23
Arizona 24.60% 4.54% 8.78% $2,962.07
Utah 23.80% 5.00% 9.89% $3,103.95
Idaho 21.10% 7.80% 9.67% $3,070.95
Texas 20.60% 0.00% 7.55% $2,693.87
North Carolina 18.50% 7.75% 9.66% $3,246.84
Georgia 18.30% 6.00% 9.17% $3,157.88
Florida 17.60% 0.00% 8.64% $3,362.07
Colorado 16.90% 4.63% 8.56% $3,675.74
South Carolina 15.30% 7.00% 8.54% $2,626.56
average 21.18% 4.27% 8.78% $3,097.82
Top Losers Population Change
 Top Marginal 
Personal Income Tax 
Rate
2000-2009 average
State/Local
 Tax Burden (%)
2000-2009 average 
State/Local
Tax Burden ($)
Pennsylvania 3.40% 7.05% 10.06% $3,717.86
Illinois 3.30% 5.00% 9.48% $3,893.67
Massachusetts 3.10% 5.30% 9.99% $4,779.85
Vermont 2.80% 8.95% 10.19% $3,714.94
West Virginia 2.50% 6.50% 9.28% $2,544.09
New York 2.10% 12.62% 11.88% $5,245.37
Ohio 1.60% 7.93% 10.11% $3,482.77
Louisiana 1.40% 3.90% 8.30% $2,554.47
Rhode Island 0.40% 5.99% 10.81% $4,142.37
Michigan -0.60% 6.85% 9.45% $3,277.07
average 2.00% 7.01% 9.95% $3,735.24
* All tax rates and burdens are state and local if applicable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Laffer Associates, Tax Foundation
TABLE 2  |  State Winners and Losers 2000-2010
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the economically moribund continent of Europe. 
Meanwhile, as Table 2 shows, the booming states 
in the Mountain West and South have been busy 
racing to the top, fortifying their economic and 
political clout over the last decade. 
So we asked the key question: has our annu-
al ranking of the economic outlook based on 15 
policy variables for the states matched the pop-
ulation trends of the 50 states? Absolutely. The 
census migration patterns confirm that, at least 
over the past decade, anti-growth economic pol-
icies repel people while low tax and limited gov-
ernment policies attract them. The 10 states with 
the highest population gains increased their resi-
dent populations by more than 21 percent, while 
the states with the lowest gains grew at only one-
tenth that pace, by 2 percent.54 That is an enor-
mous difference. 
Over the past decade, the 10 biggest popula-
tion gainers had an average state and local tax bur-
den of $3,098. The average for the 10 states with 
the lowest population gain was $3,735—more 
than 20 percent greater. The average top person-
al income tax rate in the 10 fastest growing states 
was just more than 4 percent versus more than 7 
percent in the 10 slowest growing states. Clearly, 
states with the steepest tax rates, poor labor pol-
icy, excessive levels of government spending and 
hiring, overregulation of business, and tort laws 
that encourage frivolous lawsuits end up chasing 
jobs, businesses, and families to other states. In 
contrast, low tax states were magnets for new res-
idents (see Table 2).55 
The new numbers released from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau reveal the full extent to which Ameri-
ca has become a nation of literal movers and shak-
ers. Our friend Richard Vedder calculates that “all 
told, 4,274,072 more persons moved out of the 
10 states with the highest state and local tax bur-
den (as a percent of personal income) than moved 
in. Put differently, every day on average—week-
ends and holidays included—1,265 persons left 
the high tax states, nearly one a minute.”56  Figure 
3 on page 12 shows the states that have lost the 
most congressional seats over the past 50 years.
The migration pattern from the high cost 
states to competitive states is not a new phenome-
non. Over the past decades, tens of millions of 
Americans have voted with their feet against anti-
growth policies that reduce economic freedom 
and opportunity in states mostly located in the 
Northeast and Midwest.
This decline in population—and influence—
is not a new occurrence for these states at the 
bottom. What is new in this census count is not 
nearly as intuitive. California, a state we have re-
peatedly castigated for poor policymaking in past 
editions of this publication, witnessed a historic 
first in this census. For the first time since becom-
ing a state in 1850, the Golden State will not gain 
a congressional seat through reapportionment.57  
As it turns out, liberalism’s laboratory is not 
as popular as some on the Left would have you 
believe. How a state with Silicon Valley, great re-
search institutions, not to mention the beaches of 
Santa Barbara, Big Sur, and La Jolla can be falling 
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behind in population growth is a true testament 
to the consequences of anti-growth policies.58 
The big winners in this interstate competition 
for jobs and growth have generally been the states 
in the South and West, such as Texas, Tennessee, 
Georgia, and Florida. The big losers have been in 
the Rust Belt regions of the Midwest. The demor-
alizing symptoms of economic despair in states 
like Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois include lost pop-
ulation, falling housing values, a shrinking tax 
base, business out-migration, capital flight, high 
unemployment rates, and less money for schools, 
roads, and aging infrastructure.
Escape from Detroit 
In an announcement that shocked even those 
most attuned to the horrific problems facing De-
troit, the U.S. Census Bureau recently reported 
that the Motor City has suffered a population loss 
of 25 percent in just the past 10 years, and now 
approximately only 700,000 people call Motown 
home.59 That is hardly enough for one congressio-
nal seat! It is hard to believe Detroit was home to 
nearly 2 million residents in 1950.60 
While the city’s official unemployment rate 
hovers at a Great Depression level of 28 percent, 
there is recent evidence that fewer than 37 per-
cent of Detroit’s residents are actually working.61 
Little wonder that the city of Detroit recently an-
nounced plans to demolish 10,000 abandoned 
properties.62 This is just another big failure for big 
government.
Even worse for this laboratory of liberalism, 
a recent survey conducted by Detroit Region-
al News Hub and Intellitrends shows that one in 
three metro Detroit residents would like to leave.63 
And why should they not? The city charges resi-
dents a 2.5 percent city income tax for the priv-
ilege of living within city limits.64 But that is not 
all: The revenue hungry city government actual-
ly imposes a tax on nonresidents who work in the 
city. In what is one of the worst ideas we can think 
of, the city levies a 1 percent corporate income tax 
for businesses located in the city. Did anyone ever 
tell the city’s policymakers capital is mobile? Of 
course it is very easy for capital to move between 
states, but it is even easier for profitable enterpris-
es to avoid predatory local taxes.
Unsurprisingly, only 14 percent of residents 
in the Regional News Hub-Intellitrends sur-
vey “see the region as a good place to do busi-
ness.” Alas, Motown’s anti-business philosophy 
has been ingrained for years. The “progressives” 
who have run the city government for decades are 
more concerned about preserving big government 
than about reigning in the costs of doing business 
within their borders. 
The massive loss of jobs and human capital 
from this once great American city is truly appall-
ing and should serve as a warning to states and 
cities across the country: Do not repeat the mis-
takes of the Motor City. David Littman, former 
chief economist at Comerica Bank (a company 
formerly headquartered in Detroit), says of 
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Detroit, “It can’t be stated more clearly: It’s time to 
wake up, face economic reality, and reform.”65 
More Failures of “Progressive” Policy
It must be infuriating for progressives in states 
like Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
New York to learn that their states are attracting 
fewer new people than those they have long ridi-
culed as backwaters, such as Alabama and Arkan-
sas. In fact, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode 
Island had less population growth than the na-
tion’s poorest state, Mississippi.
But doesn’t the nicer weather, rather than tax 
policy, mostly explain these variations? Without 
question weather matters, and states with milder 
climates are doing better as Northeast and Mid-
west snowbirds traverse to the South and West. 
But weather does not come close to explaining ev-
erything. Even if we look within regions of the 
country, we see differences in economic outcomes 
weather cannot explain. For example, California 
has long been the jewel of the West Coast, but 
it has raised taxes and imposed ever more strin-
gent environmental and workplace regulations. It 
ranked second to last in population growth of the 
12 westernmost states, ahead only of Montana. 
If California is the model for how not to run a 
state, as we outlined in last year’s edition of this 
publication, many governors are looking at Tex-
as, which has led the nation in job growth over 
the past three years, as the state with the best pol-
icy to emulate. Alaska may have the worst climate 
in the country and Hawaii arguably has the best, 
but Alaska had slightly faster population growth 
than Hawaii over the last decade. It is amazing, 
but true. 
Here is one explanation of why people and 
businesses choose some states over others: Of the 
nine states with no income tax, seven had above 
average population growth while only two, New 
Hampshire and South Dakota, were below the av-
erage. Nevada, Texas, and Florida—each of which 
has no income tax—all ranked in the top eight 
in migration. The other five fastest growing states 
had very low overall tax burdens. New Hamp-
shire’s population growth rate was only 6.5 per-
cent, but that was by far the highest in New Eng-
land and more than double the rate of growth 
of its sister state, Vermont, which has one of the 
highest income taxes. 
Wealthy people are not the only ones repelled 
by high taxes. People move to where the jobs are. 
Which states are those? One variable we have used 
on our economic competitiveness model is right-
to-work laws.66 We have posited that people and 
businesses want to move to places where workers 
have the freedom to decide whether they would 
like to join a union. According to an analysis by 
the National Right to Work Foundation, people 
were much more attracted to right-to-work than 
forced union states. From 2000 to 2010, right-
to-work states’ aggregate population increased 
by 15.5 percent (from 107.61 million to 124.29 
million), while forced union states’ aggregate 
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population increased by 6.1 percent (from 173.24 
million to 183.75 million).67 That amounts to two 
and a half times faster growth for states allowing 
workers the right to decide for themselves wheth-
er they want to join a union.68
When we look at the age of movers, we see 
that, indeed, the working age population is most 
influenced by right-to-work laws. From 1998 to 
2008 (the most recent period for which we have 
age specific state population data), the popula-
tion of 25–34 year olds in right-to-work states in-
creased by 16.0 percent (from 14.361 million to 
16.654 million), while the population in that age 
bracket for forced union states fell by 0.6 percent 
(from 24.32 million to 24.17 million). Right-to-
work states attract the most productive members 
of society. That young adults are overrepresented 
in the net migration indicates that jobs, not life-
style considerations, are the principal factor in the 
movement from forced union states. 
What can we deduce from all of this? Policies 
do have consequences. We live in a world that is 
in competition—for capital, jobs, and brainpow-
er. States are not just competing against each oth-
er, but they are competing against China, India, 
Indonesia, Europe, and many other places eager 
to attract businesses and jobs. That President Ba-
rack Obama, on the national level, is pushing tax 
and regulatory policies making the United States 
less competitive globally is all the more reason for 
states to get their policies aligned with growth. As 
George Buckley, CEO of 3M, said recently, “Politi-
cians forget that business has choice. We’re not in-
dentured servants and we will do business where 
it’s good and friendly. If it’s hostile, incremental-
ly, things will slip away. We’ve got a real choice 
between manufacturing in Canada and Mexico—
which tend to be pro-business—or America.”69 
Beware of the Class Warriors 
There is a lot of talk in Washington and state cap-
itals about how to promote equity and tax fair-
ness. Figure 5 shows that the rich do pay their 
fair share in federal taxes. The top 1 percent of 
earners nearly pays a larger share of federal in-
come taxes than the bottom 95 percent. This hap-
pened for the first time in American history in 
2007, even after tax rates were cut under Presi-
dent George W. Bush. 
Some critics argue that the rich pay most of 
the taxes because they make most of the income. 
Indeed, the top 1 percent of earners makes about 
25 percent of income, but their share of the fed-
eral income tax is much higher than their share 
of earned income. It is also worth noting that the 
bottom 50 percent of Americans now pays less 
than 3 percent of the total federal income tax.70 
The U.S. tax system is highly progressive already. 
Further, increasing tax rates may cause the rich to 
pay a smaller share of taxes—the opposite of the 
intended result.71 
Class warfare is, alas, still a common theme in 
state capitals around the country, and tax hikes 
aimed at the rich are in vogue with some left-
wing legislators. We have seen a record number of 
states consider or enact tax increases on the rich 
in recent years. These “millionaires taxes” levied 
on residents in the highest state tax brackets were 
all enacted in states with politically liberal domi-
nated legislatures. In each case, Stateline reports, 
“Democrats muscled through the tax rate increas-
es, arguing that wealthier residents can afford a 
higher share of the tax burden—particularly in a 
recession.”72 In Hawaii, which along with Oregon 
now shares the highest state income tax in Amer-
ica (11 percent), advocates of the big tax hike on 
the rich enacted in Honolulu usually explain the 
rationale for it in terms of class warfare. The tax 
hike targeted toward these rich is hardly going to 
help rebalance the worst real estate crisis in de-
cades in Hawaii. 
We doubt the tax hikes aimed at the wealthiest 
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residents are done. With deficits that may surpass 
$100 billion in the states for fiscal year 2012, we 
expect big pushes for tax increases in Connect-
icut, Minnesota, and yet again Maryland, Cali-
fornia, and Hawaii. It is a good bet that liberal 
legislatures will continue to try to raise rates on 
businesses and high income residents.
Class warriors often forget that many of these 
high income earners are actually small business-
es, which, through subchapter S Corporations (S 
Corps), Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs), and 
other “pass-through” entities, pay their taxes 
through the individual side of the tax code. In 
fact, these small businesses make up more than 
90 percent of all businesses, employ more than 50 
percent of American workers, and pay more than 
40 percent of all business taxes.73 Millionaires 
taxes are often paid by small business owners and 
operators, making these misguided policies job 
killers, plain and simple.
More troubling for the class warriors is the 
very real possibility that millionaires taxes will 
shift behavior and drive capital to more hospita-
ble states and then suffer the Laffer Curve effect 
of revenue losses. We will explain later in great-
er detail why this approach is likely to be a failure 
in raising revenues and in helping a state econ-
omy. For now, we point out that one state that 
raised tax rates on millionaires in 2008, Mary-
land, already witnessed a 33 percent decline in 
tax returns from millionaire households, accord-
ing to the Washington Examiner.74 Predictably, 
many misguided, left leaning pundits were quick 
to point out that this loss of millionaires was sim-
ply caused by the recession. However, a Bank of 
America-Merrill Lynch study of federal tax return 
data on people who migrated from one state to 
another found that Maryland lost $1 billion of its 
net tax base in 2008 by residents moving to other 
states.75 The rich have literally disappeared from 
the state tax collector’s sights.
State lawmakers almost always overestimate 
the popularity of tax hikes on the rich. Former 
governor Jon Corzine of New Jersey was defeated 
after raising tax rates on the rich twice.76 New Jer-
sey voters were angry at the way Mr. Corzine had 
failed to create jobs, failed to balance the budget, 
and failed to ease the highest property tax bur-
den in the nation.77 Thankfully, Chris Christie, 
his successor, who has emerged as a conservative 
star in the deficit plagued Garden State, vetoed a 
giant tax increase less than 30 minutes after the 
legislature passed it.78 He was cheered by voters 
and businesses across the state.
We hate to keep picking on California, New 
Jersey, and New York, but they continue to be 
models of how not to govern a state—though 
Gov. Christie is heroically trying to turn things 
around in New Jersey and Gov. Cuomo has so far 
impressed us with his stance on fiscal discipline 
in the Empire State. These three states impose 
tax rates at or near the highest in the nation and 
about twice the national average.
New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg 
once called Manhattan a “luxury good,” mean-
ing that people are willing to pay a premium to 
live there. The pols in Sacramento say much of the 
same thing about living in the Golden State. But 
what these jurisdictions are discovering is that 
there are limits. The rich will pay more to live in 
Santa Barbara or Manhattan penthouses for sure, 
but not hundreds of thousands or even millions 
of dollars more—compared to the tax savings of 
living and running their business in Austin, Palm 
Beach, Nashville, Seattle, or countless other cities 
in states where there is no income tax at all. And, 
again, when the rich escape, they often take more 
than their own direct tax payments. They also 
take their businesses and jobs with them. That is 
the collateral damage high tax rates have on the 
middle class and poor.
The result of these high tax rates has not been 
to balance state budgets or improve the financ-
ing of vital state services. Far from it. You cannot 
balance the budget on the backs of 1 percent of 
the most productive citizens of a state. They will 
leave, and as the 2010 census points out, they are 
leaving. The goal should be to bring them back, 
not drive them away.
Illinois and Oregon Repeat Maryland’s Folly
Lawmakers in Illinois have easily won the award 
for the worst tax policies enacted so far in 2011. 
Shortly after the New Year, during the night 
(rushing to pass the tax before the new legislature 
was	 sworn	 into	 office),	 Gov.	 Pat	 Quinn	 got	 his	
New Year’s wish to hike personal and corporate 
income tax rates. As a result of this largest tax 
increase in Illinois history, individuals in the Land 
of Lincoln will now pay an income tax rate 67 
percent higher than last year’s, and corporations 
will see their tax rates increase by 50 percent.79 
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In the state that gave us the great Ronald Rea-
gan, it is so disappointing to see that a majority of 
the current politicians in Springfield are so will-
ing to ignore the consequences of such a major 
tax increase. Unfortunately for the workers of Illi-
nois, many job creators cannot ignore such a large 
cost increase. As Doug Oberhelman, CEO of Cat-
erpillar, said, “I want to stay here, but as the lead-
er of this business, I have to do what’s right for 
Caterpillar when making decisions about where 
to invest. The direction that this state is headed in 
is not favorable to business, and I’d like to work 
with you to change that.”80  
After	Gov.	Quinn	signed	the	job	killing	tax	in-
crease into law, Steve Stanek called Illinois, the 
“Land of Larceny” in a New York Post column.81 
Governors from Scott Walker in Wisconsin to 
Chris Christie of New Jersey and Mitch Daniels 
of Indiana were busy sending welcome letters to 
Illinois businesses, explaining the benefits of re-
locating to their state.82 As the Chicago Tribune 
put it, “Too bad Mitch Daniels governs Indiana, 
not Illinois.”83 The tax increase was so unpopular 
even Mayor Richard M. Daley blasted it.84 
Illinois is, undoubtedly, in tough financial 
shape today. The state has a higher default risk 
than Iceland and is currently approaching that of 
Iraq.85 Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the state’s pension system is in full finan-
cial meltdown. To be sure, the Land of Lincoln 
faced rough financial straits before the current tax 
hike, but the low rate income tax was one of the 
state’s last remaining vestiges of pro-growth tax 
policy. Now that the lid has been blown off the 
income tax, we expect Illinois to gradually drift 
toward the dangerous category of California and 
New York.
In 2009, the Oregon Legislature raised the tax 
rate to 10.8 percent on those with family incomes 
of $250,000 and to 11 percent on income above 
$500,000—this gives Oregon the dubious dis-
tinction of being tied (with Hawaii) for the high-
est personal income taxes in the nation.86 Voters 
ratified the tax increase on individuals and an-
other on businesses in January 2010, but now the 
state treasury admits it is collecting far less reve-
nue than the bean counters projected. The Port-
land Register-Guard reports that after the tax was 
raised, “income tax and other revenue collections 
began plunging so steeply that any gains from 
the two measures seemed trivial.”87 Paul Warner, 
head of the state’s Legislative Revenue Office, 
said, “We’re thinking we’re right around half of 
what we expected about this time.”88 One rea-
son revenues are so low is that nearly one-quar-
ter of the rich tax filers seem to have gone miss-
ing. The state expected 38,000 Oregonians to pay 
the higher tax, but only 28,000 did.89 Funny how 
that always happens. On those missing returns, 
the Oregon State treasury collects a full 11 per-
cent . . . of nothing. 
During the debate, an academic study by 
the state’s free market Cascade Policy Institute 
warned of the economic harm that the tax in-
creases would cause.90 The political left ridiculed 
the study, but as the state has now suffered from 
the predicted economic malaise, Steve Buckstein, 
Cascade’s founder, says, this is a “told you so” 
story.91 
The tax was not enacted until June of 2009, 
but it was retroactively applied to earnings dat-
ing back to January 1, 2009. For the first half of 
the year, wealthy Oregon residents were unable to 
take steps to avoid the tax ambush because they 
did not see it coming. This epitomizes bad tax 
policy. One of Oregon’s most notable job creators, 
Nike’s Phil Knight, spoke out during the debate 
over the misguided tax hike. He warned Orego-
nians that the tax increases were “anti-business, 
anti-success, anti-inspirational, anti-humanitari-
an, and most ironically, in the long run, they will 
deprive the state of tax revenue, not increase it.”92 
The big revenue loss from tax mitigation strat-
egies will show up on tax return data in 2010 and 
2011. The biggest loss of revenues came from cap-
ital gains receipts. The new 11 percent top tax rate 
applies to stock and asset sales, which means Or-
egonians now pay virtually the highest capital 
gains tax in North America. Instead of $3.5 bil-
lion of capital gains in 2009, Oregon had only $2 
billion to tax—a shocking 43 percent less than ex-
pected.93 Successful people like Nike owner Phil 
Knight do not get rich by being fools with their 
money; they do not sell tens of millions of dollars 
in assets when capital gains taxes go up. 
The tax increase defenders in the Salem leg-
islature keep insisting the new levies have not 
affected business decisions or the state’s econo-
my—which is underperforming and includes an 
unemployment rate that has risen to 10 percent. 
These same lawmakers who say taxes do not mat-
ter are arranging sweetheart income and property 
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tax write-offs for giant firms so they do not have 
to pay the sky high taxes everyone else does. And 
these are the people who preach tax fairness? 
Count us as not surprised by any of this since 
it is all an instant replay of what happened in 
Maryland and other states that have unsuccessful-
ly attempted to enrich the treasury by taxing mil-
lionaires. “This is a temporary thing,” argues Phil 
Barnhart, Oregon’s House Revenue Committee 
chairman. He predicts taxes “will be back up.”94 
Perhaps, but that is what the politicos in Califor-
nia and New York have been praying for year af-
ter year as their states sink deeper into an abyss 
of debt. Oregonians were suckered into believ-
ing they could balance their budget on the backs 
of business owners and the wealthy. They should 
repeal the tax hike mishap before it does more 
harm. In the meantime, if state officials want to 
find the millionaires, they might want to start the 
search in Texas, the state that leads the nation in 
job creation and has an income tax 11 percentage 
points lower than Oregon’s. 
Oregon is tied with Hawaii now with the high-
est state income tax rate in the nation. Hawaii’s 
income tax was raised several years ago to bal-
ance the budget there. However, the Aloha State 
still reports hefty budget deficits. We have seen 
this movie before. How many times do we have to 
tell and retell this story before the politicians fi-
nally get it? The politicians in Oregon and Illinois 
chose to ignore the well-documented failures of 
past income tax increase. Unfortunately for them, 
the laws of competitiveness, or economics 101 for 
that matter, cannot be as easily ignored.
The ALEC-Laffer State Economic 
Competitiveness Model 
Of course, every state aspires to be a high octane, 
high growth state—a destination, not a place 
where people say with nostalgia that they are 
“from.” The economic performance ratings in our 
final chapter did not just happen by chance. It is 
not a random occurrence that people move from 
Michigan to Florida or from California to Texas. 
Table 3  |  aLEC-Laffer State Economic Outlook Rankings, 2011
Overall Economic Outlook Rank
1 Utah 26 North Carolina 
2 South Dakota 27 Kansas 
3 Virginia 28 New Hampshire 
4 Wyoming 29 Alaska 
5 Idaho 30 Wisconsin 
6 Colorado 31 West Virginia 
7 North Dakota 32 Nebraska 
8 Tennessee 33 Washington 
9 Missouri 34 Delaware
10 Florida 35 Connecticut 
11 Georgia 36 Montana 
12 Arizona 37 Minnesota 
13 Arkansas 38 Ohio 
14 Oklahoma 39 New Mexico 
15 Louisiana 40 Kentucky 
16 Indiana 41 Pennsylvania 
17 Nevada 42 Rhode Island 
18 Texas 43 Oregon 
19 Mississippi 44 Illinois 
20 Alabama 45 New Jersey 
21 Maryland 46 Hawaii
22 South Carolina 47 California
23 Iowa 48 Maine 
24 Massachusetts 49 Vermont 
25 Michigan 50 New York 
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They are driven by the law of supply and demand: 
High growth states supply jobs, high incomes, 
and opportunities that Americans demand. 
In this publication, we investigate what policy 
levers state legislators control that can make 
their state a desirable location. Many of the most 
important factors that make a place attractive—
such as the climate or accessibility to beautiful 
beaches or mountains or the mineral resources 
in the ground—are, of course, beyond politicians’ 
control. No one should think Gary, Ind. will ever 
compete on equal footing with Malibu, Calif., 
or that Trenton, N.J. will ever be as desirable a 
destination as Hilton Head, S.C.  
The central premise of this publication is that 
the state economic policy decisions made by state 
legislators do not matter just in terms of how a 
state performs financially; they matter much more 
than that. State officials can influence these fac-
tors, that is, the economic and fiscal policies that 
contribute to—or in all too many cases against—
the livability of a state.
In this study, we have identified 15 policy 
variables that have a proven impact on the mi-
gration of capital—both investment capital and 
human capital—into and out of states. They are 
the basic ingredients to our 2011 State Econom-
ic Competitiveness Rankings. Each of these 15 
factors is influenced directly by state lawmakers 
through the legislative process. Generally speak-
ing, states that spend less—especially on income-
transfer programs—and states that tax less—par-
ticularly on productive activities such as working 
or investing—experience higher growth rates 
than states that tax and spend more. The 15 fac-
tors are as follows: 
• Highest Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate
• Highest Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate
• Personal Income Tax Progressivity
• Property Tax Burden
• Sales Tax Burden
• Tax Burden from all Remaining Taxes
• Estate Tax or Inheritance Tax (Yes or No)
• Recent Tax Policy Changes 2009–10
• Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue
• Public Employees (Per 10,000 Residents)
• Quality	of	a	State’s	Legal	System	
• State Minimum Wage
• Workers’ Compensation Costs
• Right-to-Work State (Yes or No)
• Number of Tax or Expenditure Limits
Based on these 15 policy factors, we present to 
you the 2011 ALEC-Laffer State Economic Com-
petitiveness Index rankings of each state’s eco-
nomic outlook (see Chapter 4).
Conclusion 
The conclusion is getting to be nearly inescapable 
that states with high and rising tax burdens are 
more likely to suffer in an economic decline while 
those with lower and falling tax burdens are more 
likely to enjoy robust economic growth.  Here is a 
quick synopsis of the results:
• The overall level of taxation has an inverse re-
lationship to economic growth in a state.
• The change in the level and rate of taxation 
impacts state economic performance.
• High tax rates are especially harmful.
• Some state taxes have a more negative impact 
than others. 
Balancing state budgets and bringing jobs and 
employers back to the states in a national envi-
ronment with unemployment rates exceeding 9 
percent will be the top two priorities of governors 
and legislators in 2011. This publication will serve 
as a roadmap for how to make that happen.
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Highlights and Lowlights
Framed on a wall in Arthur Laffer’s office is a personal letter from Bill Gates the elder. “I am a fan of progressive taxation,” he wrote. 
“I would say our country has prospered from us-
ing such a system—even at 70 percent rates, to 
say nothing of 90 percent.” 
It is one thing to believe in bad policy. It is 
quite another to push it on others. But Mr. Gates 
Sr.—an accomplished lawyer, now retired—and 
his illustrious son tried to have their way with the 
people of the state of Washington this past fall. 
Mr. Gates Sr. personally contributed $600,000 
to promote a statewide proposition on Washing-
ton’s November ballot that would have imposed 
a brand new 5 percent tax on individuals earn-
ing over $200,000 per year and on couples earn-
ing over $400,000 per year. It would have levied 
an additional 4 percent surcharge on individuals 
and couples earning more than $500,000 and $1 
million, respectively.1
Along with creating a new income tax on high 
income earners, Initiative 1098 would have re-
duced property, business, and occupation taxes. 
But creating a personal income tax was the real 
issue. Doing so would put any state’s economy at 
risk.
To gauge what such a large “soak the rich” in-
come tax would do to Washington, we need only 
to examine how states with the highest income-
tax rates perform relative to their zero income tax 
counterparts. Table 4 powerfully demonstrates 
how high rate income taxes weaken economic 
performance. When you compare the nine states 
with the highest tax rates on earned income to the 
nine states with no income tax, the results speak 
awfully loudly for themselves.
In the past decade, the nine states with the 
highest personal income tax rates have, on average, 
seen gross state product increase by 44.91 percent, 
job growth increased by 0.47 percent, and popu-
lation increase 6.48 percent. In contrast, the nine 
states with no personal income tax—of which 
Washington state is one—have, on average, seen 
gross state product increase by 61.23 percent, job 
growth increased by 7.78 percent, and population 
increase by 13.75 percent.
The extent to which the states with the highest 
tax rates have underperformed those states without 
income taxes is shocking. Washington’s past 
performance is especially noteworthy. However, 
had I-1098 passed, it would have jeopardized the 
competitiveness and the economic success the 
Evergreen State has enjoyed. And passing I-1098 
would have been only the beginning. As Ohio, 
New Jersey, and California demonstrate, once a 
state adopts an income tax, there is no end to the 
number of reasons that tax could be extended, 
expanded, and increased. 
Evidence of the damage income taxes cause 
is evident outside of the comparison between 
high tax and no tax states. Over the past 50 
years, 11 states have introduced a state income 
tax exactly as Messrs. Gates and their allies pro-
posed in Washington—and as Table 4 highlights, 
the consequences to state economies have been 
devastating. 
The 11 states that adopted income taxes in the 
past 50 years are Connecticut (1991), New Jersey 
(1976), Ohio (1971), Rhode Island (1971), Penn-
sylvania (1971), Maine (1969), Illinois (1969), Ne-
braska (1967), Michigan (1967), Indiana (1963), 
and West Virginia (1961).2 Each state that intro-
duced an income tax declined as a share of to-
tal U.S. output. Some of these states—including 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio—have be-
come fiscal basket cases. As Table 5 shows, even 
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State Top PIT 
Rate*
Gross 
State 
Product 
Growth
Population 
Growth
non-farm 
Payroll 
Employment 
Growth
Gross State 
Product 
Per Capita 
Growth
Gross State 
Product Per 
Employee 
Growth
Total 
State Tax 
Receipts 
Growth**
Alaska 0.00% 80.1% 11.3% 15.03% 61.8% 59.2% 452.6%
Florida 0.00% 51.6% 15.5% 3.94% 31.3% 47.8% 82.3%
Nevada 0.00% 64.8% 31.0% 12.44% 25.9% 47.5% 100.1%
New Hampshire 0.00% 33.7% 6.8% 1.70% 25.2% 32.9% 59.6%
South Dakota 0.00% 61.5% 7.5% 7.26% 50.2% 51.2% 51.2%
Tennessee 0.00% 36.2% 10.4% -4.28% 23.4% 41.9% 61.7%
Texas 0.00% 55.7% 18.3% 10.54% 31.6% 42.5% 75.5%
Washington 0.00% 47.6% 12.7% 3.99% 30.9% 41.9% 57.8%
Wyoming 0.00% 119.8% 10.2% 19.42% 99.4% 83.7% 172.2%
9 States with no PIT** 0.00% 61.23% 13.75% 7.78% 42.19% 49.83% 123.66%
U.S. Average** 5.68% 47.05% 8.62% 1.12% 35.62% 44.92% 70.23%
9 States with Highest 
Marginal PIT Rate**
9.79% 44.91% 6.48% 0.47% 36.15% 44.73% 62.43%
Delaware 8.20% 44.9% 12.6% -1.75% 28.7% 46.2% 50.2%
Maine 8.50% 39.2% 3.2% -0.73% 34.8% 40.8% 45.3%
Maryland 8.55% 55.1% 7.3% 3.21% 44.5% 51.0% 67.0%
Vermont 8.95% 39.3% 1.9% 0.18% 36.6% 40.0% 64.5%
New Jersey 8.97% 36.9% 3.3% -1.84% 32.6% 40.5% 70.4%
California 10.30% 43.0% 8.7% -2.33% 31.6% 47.2% 77.2%
Hawaii 11.00% 58.8% 6.9% 8.57% 48.5% 47.9% 72.1%
Oregon 11.00% 46.2% 11.5% -0.59% 31.1% 46.8% 46.8%
New York 12.62% 40.8% 2.9% -0.53% 36.9% 42.2% 68.3%
*Highest marginal state and local personal income tax rate imposed as of 1/1/11 using the tax rate of each state’s largest city as a proxy for 
the local tax. The effect of the deductibility of federal taxes from state tax liability is included where acceptable. New Hampshire and Ten-
nessee tax dividend and interest income only.
** Equal-weighted averages
Source: Laffer Associates
TABLE 4  |  The nine States with the Lowest and highest Marginal Personal Income Tax (PIT) Rates
10-Year Economic Performance (1999-2009 unless otherwise noted)
West Virginia, which was poor to begin with, be-
came relatively poorer after adopting a state in-
come tax. 
The states with high income tax rates or that 
have adopted a state income tax over the past 
half-century have not even collected the mon-
ey they hoped for. They have not avoided budget 
crises, nor have they provided better lives for the 
poor. The ongoing financial travails of California, 
New Jersey, Michigan, and New York all serve to 
demonstrate this point. That’s why last year’s edi-
tion of this publication devoted an entire chapter 
to these four states, titled “Lessons on How Not to 
Govern a State.”
Over the past decade, tax revenue in the nine 
states with the highest tax rates has increased by 
an average of 62 percent, exactly half than in the 
states with no income tax. Why would Wash-
ington state want to introduce a state income tax 
when doing so means a less stable and less pre-
dictable source of money for state coffers? 
It is easy to see why we view one of the hap-
piest outcomes of last fall’s elections to be that 
Washington voters trounced Initiative 1098, the 
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Bill Gates Sr. and government employee union fi-
nanced ballot initiative to impose the state’s first 
ever income tax. Mr. Gates and his union col-
leagues spent more than $6 million on the ini-
tiative to install a progressive income tax with 
rates as high as 9 percent on wealthy residents. 
High income tax states lose jobs. Just ask Califor-
nia, New York, and New Jersey. As The Wall Street 
Journal put it, “The absence of an income tax has 
been Washington’s greatest comparative advan-
tage over its high income tax neighbors in Cali-
fornia and Oregon.”3
This was the tax that was going to be paid, 
according to Mr. Gates, only by millionaires, bil-
lionaires, and gazillionaires. But a funny thing 
happened on the way to the voting booth: Near-
ly two out of three voters (65 percent) understood 
the Laffer Curve and rejected the “soak the rich” 
tax. If he wants, Mr. Gates can pay his own volun-
tary income tax to Washington state. Special ku-
dos to Steve Ballmer and other Microsoft employ-
ees who supported the no income tax campaign. 
As we argued in last year’s edition of this pub-
lication, any state can improve its economic out-
look by replacing its personal income tax with 
a revenue neutral—or even preferably, a net tax 
cut—shift to a well-designed consumption tax. 
Washington state was wise not to go the other di-
rection. The Evergreen State also passed a mea-
sure to require a supermajority to raise taxes; it 
earned 65 percent of the vote. Washingtonians 
also voted to repeal harmful taxes on candy and 
sugary drinks (the “Coca-Cola tax”). 
We welcome the news from Washington state. 
In this chapter, we examine how other ballot ini-
tiatives around the country fared; the results in 
other states were a mixed bag.
 
California: 
The Sun Ain’t Going to Shine Anymore
While the news from Washington was positive 
on Election Day, we are still wondering what is 
wrong with California. Golden State voters opted 
to make California even less economically desir-
able by voting down a ballot initiative to suspend 
the state’s cap-and-trade energy tax until the un-
employment rate falls to 5.5 percent. With the lat-
est statistics showing state unemployment hover-
ing at 12 percent, the idea of postponing a new 
energy tax on industry, vehicles, and homeown-
ers should have seemed the height of rationality. 
Instead, liberal Silicon Valley venture capital-
ists teamed up with rich environmentalists to fi-
nance a fairy tale campaign claiming cap-and-
trade regulations will actually increase hiring by 
bringing “clean energy” jobs to the state. Some-
how, a majority of California voters were gullible 
enough to buy that. Now the state that already 
has nearly the highest taxes and energy bills in 
the country will raise these costs further, thereby 
putting an estimated one million manufacturing, 
construction, oil and gas, and transportation jobs 
at risk over the next decade. All this for a climate 
change measure even the proponents agree will 
do nothing to change the global temperature. In-
cidentally, despite the billions of dollars devoted 
to the “green energy” economy in California, only 
1–2 percent of California jobs were green jobs in 
2009.4  
Californians also voted to eliminate the two-
thirds vote requirement to pass a state budget. 
This looks to us like a license for the left-wing 
dominated legislature to borrow and spend at an 
even more ruinous pace. It is hard to believe this 
is the state that gave us Proposition 13 roughly 
30 years ago.5 It is no wonder Sacramento already 
has one of the worst credit ratings of the 50 states 
and the largest unfunded pension liabilities out-
side of Europe. At least fed up Californians can 
move to Washington state … or Tennessee. 
State
Prior to 
Income Tax
2009
Connecticut 1.74% 1.57%
New Jersey 3.50% 3.41%
Ohio 5.32% 3.32%
Rhode Island 0.43% 0.34%
Pennsylvania 5.64% 3.91%
Maine 0.38% 0.36%
Illinois 6.37% 4.43%
Nebraska 0.68% 0.60%
Michigan 5.12% 2.57%
Indiana 2.59% 1.84%
West Virginia NA 0.44%
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
TABLE 5  |  Gross State Product
Relative to the United States
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Liberals Increase Their Dominance in the 
California Legislature
Until the election, passing a budget in the Cali-
fornia Legislature required a two-thirds superma-
jority. This gave the Republican minority—which 
still holds slightly more than one-third of the 
seats in both the Assembly and the Senate—some 
say in budget matters. The requirement for a two-
thirds majority usually led to the state’s infamous 
failure to pass a budget by the June 15 deadline 
stipulated in the California Constitution. In 2010, 
the gridlock delayed passage of the fiscal 2010–11 
budget by 100 days.6
With the passage of Proposition 25, only a 
simple majority is needed to pass a budget, mak-
ing the process a whole new ballgame. Suppos-
edly, a two-thirds supermajority is still required 
to pass tax increases. Prop. 25 read, “This mea-
sure will not change the two-thirds vote require-
ment for the Legislature to raise taxes.” But Prop. 
25’s language also included this phrase: “Not-
withstanding any other provision of law . . . bills 
providing for appropriations related to the bud-
get may be passed [by] a majority.” It is anybody’s 
guess how that will be interpreted by the Legis-
lature, Gov. Jerry Brown, and the courts. Thus, 
more uncertainty has been added to the state’s 
business climate.
On a positive note, voters approved Prop. 26, 
which raises the threshold of votes in the Leg-
islature for raising “fees” to two-thirds.7 But if 
Prop. 25 is interpreted by the courts as allow-
ing a simple majority vote for tax increases, will 
that cancel out Prop. 26? The uncertainty multi-
plies. In the past, the courts have settled conflicts 
between propositions based on which received 
a greater percentage of votes. Prop. 25 (majori-
ty vote on the budget) passed with 55 percent, 
but Prop. 26 (two-thirds vote for fees) passed 
with only 53 percent. It looks as though the ma-
jor growth industry in California will be the le-
gal profession. 
Jobs-Killer California AB 32 Survives and 
Digs In 
In 2006, the California Legislature passed and Gov. 
Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly 
Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act. This 
law mandates cuts of 25 percent in greenhouse 
gases emitted in the state by 2020, less than a de-
cade away.8 Imposition began in earnest in 2011.
Proposition 23 would have suspended AB 32 
until state unemployment fell to 5.5 percent or 
below for a year. Given that state unemployment 
was 12.2 percent (seasonally adjusted) in Febru-
ary 2011, and given California’s other economic 
problems, it is likely that 5.5 percent unemploy-
ment will not be reached in the next decade, even 
if a national economic recovery catches fire.
But Prop. 23 was wiped out by voters; it re-
ceived just 39 percent of the vote, by far the low-
est yea-vote percentage of any of the nine propo-
sitions on the ballot.9 In the days leading to the 
election, polls showed that the proposition was 
trailing, but not that badly. We had hoped that 
with AB 32 digging in and destroying jobs, Cal-
ifornia voters might be inclined to stop the de-
struction. Prop. 23’s clear defeat on November 2 
probably ends such hopes. California will have to 
live with AB 32.
Meanwhile, AB 32 is gutting jobs. Earlier this 
year, Boeing transferred 800 jobs from Long Beach 
to Oklahoma City. Boeing did not give a reason, 
but critics blamed the move on the aerospace gi-
ant’s fear of AB 32.10 San Bernardino County Su-
pervisor Brad Mitzelfelt warned that AB 32 ba-
sically will kill California’s cement industry, 
currently the nation’s largest, especially hitting 
the inland areas already suffering unemployment 
levels ranging from 15–30 percent.11
AB 32 gives the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) vast new powers over the economy, 
including a new carbon trading scheme. On Octo-
ber 28, 2010, CARB announced its initial phase of 
the program. This shows what businesses in Cal-
ifornia will have to put up with now (in addition 
to all the other regulations and taxes):
SACRAMENTO - Today the California Air 
Resources Board announced the release of 
its proposed greenhouse gas cap-and-trade 
regulation….
A key part of CARB’s AB 32 Scoping Plan, 
the cap-and-trade program provides an 
overall limit on the emissions from sources 
responsible for 85 percent of California’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. This program 
allows covered entities the greatest flexi-
bility for compliance, stimulates clean en-
ergy technologies, increases energy secu-
rity and independence, protects public 
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health and will drive clean, green jobs in 
California. It is designed to work in collab-
oration with other complementary policies 
that expand energy efficiency programs, 
reduce vehicle emissions, and encourage 
innovation.12
Other states and countries, of course, don’t 
have to follow AB 32. Advocates of the ill-designed 
legislation maintain that it will create jobs in prom-
ising “green” industries. But the few jobs created 
would be overshadowed by up to 1.1 million jobs 
killed by its implementation, according to a study 
by the California Small Business Roundtable.13
As an additional note, the combined Los An-
geles–Long Beach port system is by far the largest 
in the United States. San Francisco and San Diego 
also host major ports. Yet AB 32 regulations will 
force ships coming into these ports to slow down 
when crossing the Pacific in order to burn less 
fuel. Ports on the other side of the Panama Canal 
surely are licking their chops for 2014, when the 
new, enlarged canal will open. However, the U.S. 
Constitution gives the power to regulate foreign 
trade to the U.S. Congress, likely meaning law-
suits brought by shipping companies will thwart 
California’s state level shipping regulations. Again 
we see more uncertainty—and another reason to 
avoid California entirely.
California Senate Bill 375
AB 32 is not the only massive new legislative as-
sault on California businesses. In 2008, the Leg-
islature passed and Gov. Schwarzenegger signed 
into law Senate Bill 375, the Redesigning Com-
munities to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Act. Even 
the title is reminiscent of Soviet-era central plan-
ning. The governor’s fact sheet explains:
The single-largest source of greenhouse 
gases in California is emissions from pas-
senger vehicles, and in order to reduce 
those emissions, we must work to re-
duce Californians’ vehicle-miles traveled 
(VMTs). That means helping people spend 
less time in their cars to get to work and to 
the grocery store. In order to reach Califor-
nia’s greenhouse gas reductions goals set 
out in the Global Warming Solutions Act 
of 2006 (AB 32), we must rethink how we 
design our communities.
Senate Bill 375 by incoming Senator Pro 
Tem Darrell Steinberg would be the nation’s 
first law to control greenhouse gas emis-
sions by curbing sprawl. SB 375 provides 
emissions-reducing goals for which regions 
can plan, integrates disjointed planning ac-
tivities, and provides incentives for local 
governments and developers to follow new 
conscientiously-planned growth patterns. 
SB 375 enhances the Air Resources Board’s 
(ARB) ability to reach AB 32 goals.14
“Sprawl” is the central planners’ epithet for 
nice suburban homes for the middle class, or Cal-
ifornia’s style of living for the past century. SB 
375—combined with AB 32—effectively gives 
CARB vast new authority to force Californians 
out of their homes into high-rises and out of their 
cars into mass transit. Moreover, by further in-
creasing the cost of doing business in California, 
these regulations will drive more manufacturing 
and construction jobs from the state. Indeed, the 
continued exodus from California is being well-
documented by Joseph Vranich, the “Business Re-
location Coach,” who notes that at least 204 com-
panies had redirected capital out of California in 
2010, compared to only 51 total in 2009.15
Unions Checkmated
On a positive note, voters in Arizona, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, and Utah voted to ban union 
card-check measures in their states. These “Save 
the Secret Ballot” initiatives provide a constitu-
tional guarantee that workers cannot be bullied 
by union bosses to form a workplace union. These 
measures passed with more than 60 percent of 
the vote in Arizona and Utah and with more 
than 70 percent of the vote in South Carolina 
and South Dakota. This is good news all around 
since unions are trying to pass forced unioniza-
tion bills at the federal level and in at least half of 
state legislatures. 
Card-check, deceptively pushed at the feder-
al level as the “Employee Free Choice Act,” would 
eliminate secret ballots in union elections. In-
stead, a union would form automatically as long 
as more than 50 percent of workers sign a peti-
tion. Voters are not interested in eliminating secret 
ballots in elections, as they demonstrated clearly 
in Arizona, North Carolina, North Dakota, and 
Utah on Election Day. Card check bills essentially 
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come down to the fact that their proponents be-
lieve unions need more power: To get more pow-
er they need more members and more money, and 
the way to do that is to change the rules. 
Unions tend to have a negative impact on the 
economy, however. Excessive union influence ap-
pears to have been one of the pivotal factors that 
turned an economic downturn in 1929 into the 
Great Depression. According to a 2009 study by 
Lee Ohanian, an economics professor at UCLA 
and economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, union influence caused companies 
to strike a deal that effectively, but artificially, in-
creased real wages for manufacturer workers in 
the midst of a recession.16 The result is precisely 
what economics would predict: employers could 
no longer afford to pay workers for the same num-
ber of hours they had been working prior to the 
wage increases. 
In what has been a very positive trend for the 
U.S. economy, the total percentage of the U.S. 
workforce with union membership has been de-
clining steadily and steeply for approximately 30 
years. However, this trend reversed in 2008 (see 
Figure 6). Based on the policies and priorities of 
the Obama administration, this reversal may per-
sist for many years.
In our view, the explanation for the decline in 
union strength for the previous 30 years in all ar-
eas except government is simple enough: Unions 
place firms at a competitive disadvantage, and 
they do little to benefit workers directly. As the 
forces of globalization make business more and 
more competitive, American firms cannot survive 
if they are hobbled by inefficient labor arrange-
ments demanded by union leaders. Furthermore, 
many union members vehemently disagree with 
the way union leaders use their union dues for po-
litical purposes.17 
As long as a labor market is competitive, 
workers are generally paid equal to their margin-
al product of labor. This is not because of an em-
ployer’s sense of benevolence or fair play; instead 
it is because of the competition between firms. If 
a particular worker annually adds $50,000 to a 
firm’s bottom line while he earns only $45,000, a 
rival firm can afford to try to lure him away by of-
fering to pay him up to $5,000 more than his cur-
rent employer is paying. To avoid losing effective 
employees, it is in employers’ best interest to pay 
workers according to the value they create. 
Unions certainly do not change these funda-
mental facts for the better. Although they might 
serve to reduce transactions costs when negoti-
ating arrangements between employers and huge 
pools of workers, unions typically achieve deals 
(through threats of strikes or worse) that force a 
firm to pay more total compensation (in the form 
of wages, health insurance, and other benefits) 
than is justified by an employee’s marginal prod-
uct. Unions also tend to negotiate counterproduc-
tive or excessive work rules, vacation time, sick 
leave, health benefits, pension benefits, and so 
forth; they tend to be very political and work to 
enforce their ends via political means. 
All of these excessive costs above a worker’s 
actual output erode the firm’s profits and leave it 
vulnerable to other firms. A nonunion firm, pre-
sumably operating at a point where the real wage 
is equal to the marginal product of labor, can eas-
ily undercut unionized firms and steal their cus-
tomers, their business, and their profits. In a com-
petitive industry, unionization has a devastating 
effect on a firm’s profits. In the long run, union-
ized firms are forced to shut down because non-
union firms seize the business by selling a simi-
lar good at a lower cost. When a firm shuts down, 
the union workers are out of luck and out of work. 
This outcome does not benefit the workers in the 
unionized firm. 
The recent experience of General Motors, 
Chrysler, and Ford should remove any doubts 
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concerning the devastating impact unions can 
have on the future viability of a company or in-
dustry. Unions do not just have a negative impact 
on private industry, though. The unions dominate 
state government in California, more so now than 
in 1990, and that power is growing every day. The 
power they hold is frightening. California’s pen-
sion systems are far worse today than they were in 
1990. Pensions for state teachers and other state 
employees, as well as those for city, county, and 
local district employees, are drastically under-
funded. Public sector unions are literally bank-
rupting the state to an extent we have never be-
fore witnessed. That is precisely why unions were 
fading away as global competition intensified.
It is for these reasons that unions find their 
only refuge in government jobs. Competition and 
quality products are not union attributes. Expe-
rience with the Department of Motor Vehicles, 
public schools, or public prisons gives credence 
to this assessment.
Health Care Freedom
In Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma, the elector-
ate voted on a key feature of the new ObamaCare 
law. These initiatives preserve the right of cit-
izens in these states not to purchase health in-
surance. Arizona and Oklahoma voters easily ap-
proved these “health care choice” measures, but 
Coloradans voted no. These were voter referen-
dums on ObamaCare, and the results show that 
voters are not wild about what Barack Obama 
calls his most historic achievement. Missouri vot-
ers  passed ALEC’s Freedom of Choice in Health 
Care Act in 2010, with 71 percent of the vote. 
All of the uncertainty regarding the specifics 
of implementation of President Obama’s health 
care reform notwithstanding, the economics is 
straightforward. From the standpoint of Econ 
101, a market keeps check on prices and costs 
through a dynamic interchange between suppli-
ers of products and demanders of products. When 
a person walks into a store he has a vast array of 
wants and needs and a budget. Whenever a prod-
uct is too pricey, the consumer either buys less 
or abstains from buying any of it at all. On see-
ing sales fall, suppliers either lower their prices or 
withdraw some supply from the marketplace.
This is a no brainer. Consumers of any prod-
uct keep suppliers in check and control pric-
es. Health care services are no different than any 
other product. But when health care expenditures 
are covered by private insurance or public funds, 
individual consumers care less about price and, 
thus, exercise less control over unwarranted price 
increases. Consumers also tend to consume larger 
quantities of the higher priced products than they 
would were they required to pay for those prod-
ucts out of their own pockets. It really is as simple 
as that. As former U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm of Tex-
as notes, if he had to pay only five cents for each 
dollar of groceries he bought, he would eat really 
well—and so would his dog. Consumers who do 
not have to pay the full price for each additional 
unit they buy will consume more than they need. 
That is Econ 101.
The huge increase in health care costs over 
the past half century has been greatly exacerbated 
by the sharp decline in the percentage of health 
care costs paid for by individuals out of their own 
pockets and the ever-increasing role played by the 
government and private insurance. 
In Figure 7 we have plotted the shares of health 
care expenditures paid for by individuals, govern-
ment, and private insurance.
ObamaCare displays a fundamental lack of 
understanding of basic economics, as its man-
dates for more government and more insurance 
starkly demonstrate. Voters in Arizona, Missouri, 
and Oklahoma were wise to strike down part of 
health care reform, and we hope more states fol-
low in their footsteps.
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
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Other State Ballot Highlights
Tax Measures
Georgians passed Referendum A, which exempts 
business inventories from state property taxes.
Indiana	passed	Question	1,	which	will	cap	prop-
erty taxes at 1 percent, rental property in residen-
tial areas at 2 percent, and taxes for business at 3 
percent. Though these are not as stringent as lim-
its in other states, advocates believe the caps will 
protect residents of Indiana from wild increases 
in property tax payments.18
Louisiana passed one of the most fiscally con-
sequential measures of any state. Its Amendment 
6 requires a two-thirds majority vote in the Leg-
islature to authorize any benefit for state employ-
ees if the benefit is a cost to the taxpayers. In Lou-
isiana, as in so many states, public pensions and 
health plans are bankrupting taxpayers. The un-
funded liabilities of states and cities for govern-
ment employee benefits are estimated at between 
$2 and $3 trillion.19 Let us hope this is the start of 
a trend to reign in bloated state pensions. 
Missouri voters overwhelmingly approved a 
measure to prohibit cities from enacting an in-
come/wage tax and phases out the wage tax in 
St. Louis and Kansas City. The language reads 
as follows: 
Proposition A repeals the authority for cit-
ies to levy an earnings tax, require voter 
approval for the continuation of earnings 
taxes in Kansas City and St. Louis at the 
next municipal election and every five 
years thereafter, require any earnings tax 
not approved by voters to be phased out 
over 10 years, and prohibit all cities in Mis-
souri from imposing a new earnings tax.20
This initiative was sponsored by Rex Sinque-
field, president of the St. Louis–based Show-Me 
Institute. The data show persuasively that cit-
ies with income and wage taxes have lower job 
growth and capital investment.
The results in Massachusetts were more 
mixed. The bad news there: Massachusetts vot-
ers rejected a plan to halve the state sales tax. The 
good news: they also rejected a bill passed by the 
legislature to impose a new tax on alcohol.21
Other Measures
One of the most disappointing Election Day out-
comes was Florida voters’ rejection of Amend-
ment 8, which would have repealed a constitu-
tional class size mandate in public schools. Had it 
passed, the amendment would have allowed flex-
ibility for districts in meeting class size reduction 
requirements. The measure that mandates mini-
mum class sizes in Florida schools is expected to 
cost the state $40 billion over the next 20 years. 
This triumph for the teachers’ unions puts Florida 
in a deep fiscal hole going forward.22 
Also in Florida, 52 percent voted to overturn 
the state’s wasteful public campaign finance op-
tion, but 60 percent was needed for passage.23 Flo-
ridians also approved Referendum 1 for a balanced 
budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution.24
Here is one of our favorites: Illinois made it 
easier for voters to recall the governor. Call it the 
Blagojevich law.25
Montana voters passed Initiative 105 to pro-
hibit state or local governments from imposing 
any new taxes on transactions that sell or trans-
fer real property.26 A very bad initiative passed as 
well, though; Initiative 164 caps annual interest 
rates of payday loans at 36 percent.27 These re-
strictive rate caps on short loans could put payday 
lenders out of business, which would eliminate 
a financial option for struggling residents living 
paycheck to paycheck. 
Oklahoma	 wisely	 defeated	 Question	 744,	
which would have required the legislature to fund 
public education to at least the per pupil average 
of neighboring states.28 While this was a dream of 
the teachers’ unions, higher per pupil spending 
has not necessarily led to improved education.
Conclusion
It was a wild year politically. Yet while the feder-
al elections stole the show, a number of interest-
ing battles were fought through state ballot ini-
tiatives. Kudos to those states that moved toward 
pro-growth policies or fought off policies that dis-
courage production. Kudos to Washington state 
in particular for its bold stand against the institu-
tion of a state income tax on the “rich.”
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Prosperity 101:
Lessons for State Economic Growth
In the last several years we have witnessed some of the most misguided economic poli-cies in decades, both at the federal and state 
levels. In many cases, sound economic policies 
that create jobs and prosperity have been tossed 
aside for gimmicks and old mistakes.
These policy errors have been so plentiful and 
so fundamentally backwards we are compelled 
to go back to the basics and ask some elemental 
questions. What causes prosperity? How does a 
nation or a state create jobs? Which policies have 
worked throughout history to generate economic 
growth in a state or country, and which have not? 
This is written for lawmakers and other decision 
makers in state capitals and in Washington, D.C. 
We call this chapter Prosperity 101 because it of-
fers a simple-to-understand roadmap for regain-
ing prosperity given the economic havoc that has 
reigned now for several years. 
The Tragedy of “Obamanomics”
The verdict is in: The $3 trillion experiment in 
government as the solution to our economic prob-
lems has been a resounding failure.1 When the 
economy collapsed in 2008, almost every step 
the Bush administration, the Obama administra-
tion, and the Federal Reserve Board took made 
the economy worse, not better.
The damage from the stock market contrac-
tion and bank failures could have been contained 
and short lived, if not for a series of disastrous 
policy strategies in Washington. The politicians 
could not keep from intervening over and over 
again. And that combination of policy malfea-
sance, ignorance, and arrogance has put America 
into a $14 trillion debt spiral for which our chil-
dren, our grandchildren, and our great-grand-
children will have to pay.2
In this stage of the economic recovery, June 
2011, the economy is growing, but much more 
slowly than we would expect. During the early 
stages of the Reagan expansion in 1983–84, the 
economy grew by as much as 8 percent—more 
than three times faster than the pace of growth we 
have seen over the past year. The unemployment 
rate set a post-World War II record, staying above 
9 percent for 21 straight months.3 The stimulus 
was supposed to create 3 million jobs; instead it 
has corresponded with the loss of 2 million.4 
Some liberals say President Obama did not 
spend enough, but this is sheer fantasy. Rarely 
have we witnessed such a deluge of new spend-
ing in the nation’s history. The Santa Claus spend-
ing agenda was signed into law within 40 days 
of the new presidency: What a victory for liberal-
ism. American families tightened their belts, cut 
expenses, saved more, worked harder, and paid 
off debts, while in Washington it was like Christ-
mas, Easter, and the 4th of July all wrapped into 
one gigantic spending party. Agencies were so 
flush with stimulus cash, they could not spend 
fast enough. Money was allocated for myriad proj-
ects ranging from golf carts for federal workers 
to a mouse eradication project in Nancy Pelosi’s 
congressional district.5 While Americans suffered 
through a horrid recession, the government cele-
brated as if happy days were here again. 
The height of the folly came with the Obama 
administration’s Cash for Clunkers program, 
which paid Americans $3,500–$4,500 to trade in 
old cars if they were buying new cars with bet-
ter gas mileage.6 This program of free money for 
clunkers was wildly popular: Americans rushed 
to new car showrooms to get their checks, some 
for ten times the trade-in value of their cars. They 
were winning the lottery. 
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Of course, taking good cars off the road and de-
stroying them so people will buy new cars is as ec-
onomically illiterate as using rocks and sledgeham-
mers to break the windows of buildings so people 
will be put to work and paid handsomely for the 
repairs. The fallacy of logic here was exposed in 
the unforgettable book, Economics in One Lesson, 
by Henry Hazlett. Money spent on window re-
pairs and unnecessary new cars is money that can-
not be spent on home renovations or new washing 
machines. In other words, while the destruction 
of valuable goods may benefit the industry called 
upon for repair or replacement in the short term, 
it imposes a long term cost on society and removes 
value from the economy that may otherwise have 
created even more wealth. As our friend John Stos-
sel explains it, “leave it to politicians to think we 
can prosper by obliterating wealth.”7
Despite Cash for Clunkers, America contin-
ued to lose jobs—though, yes, auto jobs increased 
temporarily as we paid people to buy new cars. In 
addition to increased spending, the Obama ad-
ministration worked to continue the nationaliza-
tion of industry that began with banks, mortgage 
companies, insurance firms, and Wall Street in-
vestment houses. Next on the docket was a mul-
tibillion-dollar takeover of the auto industry. 
Chrysler and General Motors were to be rescued 
by Washington—but really the entity being saved 
was the United Auto Workers union.
We witnessed a ham-handed, and possibly 
unconstitutional bankruptcy designed by the 
unions and the White House. This was not a nor-
mal bankruptcy. Instead, the federal government 
essentially stole $3–$5 billion rightfully owned 
by the GM and Chrysler creditors—the owners 
of the car companies’ secured debt—and secured 
the money for the unions. This conflicted with 
centuries of corporate contract law that says cred-
itors are first in line to claim a company’s assets. 
Creditors should be paid before other stakehold-
ers, like shareholders and workers. In this case, 
the Obama administration ripped up the credi-
tors’ contracts and strong-armed the bondhold-
ers into taking pennies on the dollars they were 
owed. At the time of the crisis, Richard Mour-
dock, the Treasurer of the State of Indiana, testi-
fied before the Congressional Oversight Panel. In 
his testimony, Mourdock asked the panel, “If the 
term “secured creditor” no longer has meaning, 
what other terms of art in the world of finance 
no longer have meaning?” He warned the panel, 
“Change the rules and the players will change. If 
foreign investors in U.S. Treasury debt sense that 
“good faith and credit of the United States govern-
ment” can be swept away with an arbitrary act to 
deal with a momentary crisis, we will have a prob-
lem far, far greater than Chrysler in scope and im-
pact.”8 We could not agree more with Mr. Mour-
dock. Unfortunately with their shoulders to the 
wheel, this administration brushed off the warn-
ing and continued to drive us to the cliff. 
President Obama even publicly castigated the 
hedge funds that owned many of these bonds for 
their lack of cooperation and selfishness. Rich 
hedge fund managers were not being looted, 
though; pension funds and those with IRAs and 
401(k) plans invested in the auto companies saw 
their savings pillaged for the sake of union boss-
es. The long term effects of the government’s void-
ing contract law for political expedience may be 
devastating. 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve Board, un-
der the management of Chairman Ben Bernan-
ke, delegated to itself exceptional powers to save 
the United States from another Great Depression. 
The Fed played an instrumental role in orches-
trating the bank bailouts. It helped manipulate 
who would run which companies—which CEOs 
were in, which were out. It helped mastermind 
the merger of Merrill Lynch and Bank of Amer-
ica—threatening to crush Bank of America if it 
refused to take on the struggling company. The 
constitutionality of these actions is suspect, but 
Mr. Bernanke was acting as the savior of the glob-
al financial system. This apparently means rules, 
like those in the Constitution, could be bent or 
expended.
 Recently, the Fed adopted a policy called 
Quantitative	Easing	(QE-2),	which	is	a	fancy	way	
of saying it will print $600 billion to purchase 
federal debt.9 This is supposed to create jobs, but 
it is more likely to create higher prices. The Fed 
can print money, but it cannot print jobs.
The total costs of bailouts, stimulus plans, 
Fed-orchestrated buyouts, and so forth have al-
ready totaled in the trillions.10 That is a mighty 
high price tag. Was it worth it?
Free Lunch Economics
The trillions already spent is a huge sum of mon-
ey and eventually the bill will come due—bills 
CHAPTER THREE
36 Rich States, Poor States
always do. The tragedy in all this spending is 
that it was unnecessary: For all that was devot-
ed to picking winners and losers in the economy, 
Congress simply could have suspended the fed-
eral income tax for 18 months. This would have 
been a far less expensive and much more effective 
tonic for the economy. Imagine if all businesses 
and workers had been notified they could keep 
everything they earned—there would be no in-
come tax withholding, no business profits taxes, 
no taxes on savings and investment; the econo-
my would have recovered at breakneck speed and 
jobs lost would have been a fraction of what they 
have been. 
The Keynesian premise under which the 
Obama administration has been operating—
that government spending on make-work proj-
ects puts the economy back on its feet—is highly 
disputable. The theory is that government should 
spend money and create demand for goods and 
services to keep the economy afloat as consumers 
are reluctant to spend during a recession. This is 
exemplified when we hear the happy talk of the 
Keynesian multiplier, the claim that $1 in addi-
tional government spending translates to $2 or $3 
additional economic output because the money 
circulates many times throughout the economy. 
There is a big hole in this theory and an even 
bigger problem with its real life track record. The 
theory is leaky because it ignores a basic prem-
ise of economics: As Milton Friedman famously 
taught many years ago, “There’s no such thing as 
a free lunch.” There is no fairy who magically en-
dows the economy with dollars for the govern-
ment to spend. It is not that simple. 
The money the government spends originates 
somewhere. The government obtains dollars to 
spend in three ways: by borrowing, taxing, and 
printing. Each of these options carries negative 
consequences that outweigh any positive effects 
of the government’s spending. 
If it borrows the money, someone has to buy 
the bonds the government issues so the mon-
ey can be spent. Every borrowed dollar the gov-
ernment spends is first taken out of the econo-
my through the purchase of these bonds. (While 
foreigners do purchase about half of these bonds, 
the costs associated with foreign debt ownership 
may even be worse.) At best, the net effect of gov-
ernment borrowing on stimulating the economy 
is zero. 
If the government raises taxes to obtain the 
money to spend, the cost to the economy is high-
er. In this scenario, dollars are taken from pro-
ductive workers who earned the money with their 
labor and given to people and government agen-
cies that did not earn the money. The net effect 
of this redistribution scheme is negative because 
there is a 20–30 cents per dollar cost associated 
with collecting taxes. While the recipient of the 
tax dollar may spend that money at McDonalds or 
Walmart to create a multiplier effect, it costs the 
economy $1.20 or more to get that dollar circulat-
ing after the taxman plays his part.
Finally, if the government obtains money by 
printing more dollars, the value of all other dol-
lars is reduced. In other words, if the government 
magically doubled the supply of money—all else 
being equal—the value of every dollar would be 
half what it was. If printing money were the ticket 
to wealth creation, Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexi-
co would be rolling in prosperity. 
The costs associated with obtaining money for 
government spending represent a major flaw in 
the Keynesian theory. An examination of the real-
life impact “stimulus plans” have had in the past 
demonstrates that the theory has not held true in 
practice either. First, let us look at the New Deal. 
This was the largest peacetime experiment—un-
til now—of government spending as stimulus. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elect-
ed in 1932 in the midst of the Great Depression, 
and upon taking office he launched what be-
came known as an alphabet soup of government 
programs to combat unemployment. Govern-
ment expenditures rose over 83 percent; funds 
were used to pay for new jobs programs, agricul-
ture programs, welfare, Social Security, and sim-
ilar programs.11 Under the New Deal, the feder-
al government burned crops in the field to reduce 
the supply of food in an effort to keep food prices 
high.12 The government believed doing so would 
help raise farmers’ incomes. Meanwhile, as the 
government was destroying crops, cities were 
filled with tens of thousands of Americans who 
were going to bed hungry each night due to a lack 
of income and food shortages. 
Tragically, none of the New Deal programs 
worked. The more the government spent and bor-
rowed (the federal debt rose by a then unthink-
able level for peacetime), the more the economy 
contracted. Even FDR’s own Treasury Secretary 
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declared the spending barrage a failure at get-
ting Americans back to work.13 School books cel-
ebrate the New Deal as a success, but the actual 
data show it as an abject failure and responsible 
for prolonging depression economic conditions.14 
Figure 8 shows that during the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs failed 
to bring the unemployment lower than 20 per-
cent. The jobless rate actually rose after the sec-
ond phase.15   
There is also a more contemporary example 
showing the failures of Keynesian demand-side 
economics. Japan tried several fiscal stimulus 
plans in the 1990s and early 2000s in an effort to 
end the nearly two-decade depression that started 
in 1991. The whole country was paved in concrete 
through public works programs; even parts of the 
ocean were paved over when they were finished 
on the land. What was the result of this borrow 
and spend stimulus? Japan’s budget transformed 
from a 2 percent surplus of GDP in 1990 to an 
8 percent deficit of GDP in 2002.16 After years of 
government pump priming, a substantial amount 
of the country’s financial wealth had disappeared. 
This is hardly a model we should emulate.
All Debt Is Not Created Equal 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration in-
curred $2 trillion of debt in the 1980s, but that 
debt accomplished two missions of great long-
term consequence. First, it helped finance the 
Cold War military buildup that helped free the 
world from communist tyranny. Second, it fi-
nanced tax rate reductions that helped rebuild 
the U.S. economy after the stagflation the econo-
my suffered under President Jimmy Carter in the 
1970s. Although the debt rose by $2 trillion un-
der President Reagan, national wealth increased 
by at least $6 trillion.17 Despite the evidence that 
tax rate reductions have worked to spur econom-
ic growth, the Obamanomics agenda was cen-
tered on Keynesian economic theories that have 
yet to work in practice and did not include any 
pro-growth tax cuts.18  
What Does Lead to Growth?
The policy ideas that lead to prosperity are those 
that are consistent with promoting economic free-
dom. This is true for countries and states. Coun-
tries with more economic freedom have strong 
property rights, low taxes, light regulation, free 
trade, sound money, right of contract, private op-
eration of business, and other such measures that 
limit undue government interference in the mar-
ket. In general, interference with the free market 
inhibits growth.19
Figure 9 on page 38 succinctly demonstrates 
how economic freedom leads to growth. It shows 
that the countries that adhere most closely to the 
principles of economic freedom, as measured by 
the Cato Institute, have had the most success in 
raising the living standards of their citizens. We 
have consistently found the same principle to be 
true for states. Americans, because we live in a 
Figure 8  |  unemployment Rate for non-farm Workers, 1926-1947
Source: The Heritage Foundation
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country that is mostly free (though moving in the 
wrong direction in some regards), have a living 
standard that is roughly ten times higher than 
that of those living in countries that repress the 
market and do not respect individual rights. 
Figure 9 is instructive for another reason. 
Some critics say free markets, although they create 
growth, cause other problems, such as social ineq-
uities, pollution, and other injustices. We looked 
at another measure of well-being: health, as mea-
sured by life expectancy. We found that economic 
freedom is also highly correlated with a higher life 
expectancy. Free countries like the United States 
have average life expectancies nearly twenty years 
longer than socialized countries that do not re-
spect private property. This means economically 
free countries are not just wealthier, they are also 
healthier. Other studies have found that econom-
ic freedom is highly correlated with reductions 
in pollution levels as well.20 The evidence is clear 
that freedom, low taxes, and prosperity are the 
best medicines for whatever ails a state. This sec-
tion will examine some of these important prin-
ciples for economic freedom and, consequently, 
Figure 9  |  Economic freedom: free Countries are Wealthier and healthier
Source: Cato Institute and Fraser Institute
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Figure 10  |  Share the Wealth? 
Top Marginal Income Tax Rates and Income Tax Share for the Top Percent of Earners, 1970-2008
‛70 ‛73 ‛77 ‛79 ‛82 ‛85 ‛88 ‛91 ‛94 ‛97 ‛00 ‛03 ‛06
M
ar
gi
na
l T
ax
 R
at
e
Share Paid by Top 1%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80 45%
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
80%
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service  
Top Personal Income Tax Rate
Top 1% Share
‛08
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
PROSPERITY 101: Lessons for State Economic Growth
www.alec.org        39
growth: keeping taxes low, guarding against in-
flation, and keeping budgets in check. 
Principle 1: Keep Tax Rates Low 
President Reagan understood the importance of 
keeping tax rates low better than any president in 
recent history. The tax cuts made under the Rea-
gan administration were inspired in large part by 
his experience as an actor. As he explained, ac-
tors in his day would make only three movies in 
a year. If they made a fourth, their tax rate would 
go up to such an extent that it would be unprofit-
able. President Reagan recognized that the same 
logic applied in other sectors of the economy, and 
in August 1981, he signed into law the largest tax-
rate cut in history. When President Reagan took 
office in 1981, the top marginal tax rate on indi-
viduals was 70 percent. By the time Ronald Rea-
gan left office in 1989, the top marginal rate was 
reduced to 28 percent.21 Amazing but true.
 With Paul Volcker at the helm of the Feder-
al Reserve, President Reagan also reined in infla-
tion and moved swiftly to lift many burdensome 
regulations. His administration marked the be-
ginning of the greatest period of prosperity in the 
history of the world. America’s net worth climbed 
in real terms from $25 trillion in 1980 to near-
ly $57 trillion in 2010.22 Between 1981 and to-
day, more wealth was created than in the previ-
ous 200 years.23 
The policy works for Republicans as well as 
Democrats. President John F. Kennedy’s supply-
side tax cuts in 1961 serve as a shining example 
of good policy overcoming partisanship. Presi-
dent Kennedy knew high tax rates were restrict-
ing growth so much that the federal government 
could actually increase revenues by cutting taxes. 
It is increasingly clear that no matter which par-
ty is in power—as long as our national security 
needs keep rising—what President Kennedy said 
in a 1963 speech to the Economic Club of New 
York remains true: “An economy constrained by 
high tax rates will never produce enough revenue 
to balance the budget, just as it will never create 
enough jobs.”24 Nor will an economy restricted by 
high tax rates produce profits sufficient to coun-
teract government spending. 
Figure 10 on page 38 confirms that President 
Kennedy was right. When tax rates have fallen at 
the federal level, the share of taxes paid by the 
wealthy has increased. In 1980, when the top tax 
rate was 70 percent, the wealthiest 1 percent of 
Americans paid a little less than 20 percent of all 
federal income taxes. By 2007, when the top tax 
rate was 35 percent—half what it was in 1980—
the share of taxes paid by the wealthy rose to 41 
percent. 
Lowering tax rates increases the incentive to 
work and invest. As marginal tax rates decrease, 
the incentive to invest in the United States also 
increases. Lower personal and corporate tax rates 
attract investment by making it possible for busi-
nesses to be more profitable. Thus, lower rates en-
courage new firms to enter the market and may 
entice established firms to relocate. 
The U.S. tax system is especially uncompeti-
tive in this area: the country’s corporate tax rate 
now ranks second highest in the world when state 
business tax rates are included.25 Figure 11 shows 
that the trend is unfavorable to the United States. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. corporate 
tax rate was below the average rate of our compet-
itor countries. Now, the U.S. rate is significantly 
higher than the average of developed countries—
nearly 15 percentage points higher. Even Swe-
den has a lower corporate tax rate than the com-
bined state/federal rate in most of the 50 states. 
Almost everyone, including the Obama admin-
istration’s own tax reform commission, believes 
this puts the United States at a competitive disad-
vantage and costs America jobs.26 States with high 
corporate tax rates—including California, New 
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York, Iowa, and Illinois—have the highest com-
bined federal and state corporate tax rate among 
all members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This is a 
sure way to export jobs out of these states and out 
of the United States entirely. Reducing state and 
federal business taxes should be a high priority 
for state lawmakers. 
Keep the United States Competitive
In addition to addressing corporate tax rates to 
make the country more competitive, the United 
States should consider a more holistic change in 
tax policy. In the past couple of decades, the rest 
of the world began to understand the virtues of 
supply-side economics while the U.S. government 
understanding appears to have regressed. Many 
countries formerly under socialism now embrace 
tax systems far more pro-growth than the U.S. tax 
system. 
It is time for a flat tax in America. Table 6 
shows that many countries around the world have 
adopted flat taxes. A flat tax of 15-20 percent 
would attract investment and jobs to the United 
States like a giant high-voltage magnet. It would 
also simplify the tax code and reduce special in-
terest loopholes high-powered lobbyists have 
carved out for their clients. 
Lowering tax rates is also an important way 
to attract capital. As Figure 12 shows, the United 
States transitioned from a country exporting cap-
ital in the 1970s to one importing capital after tax 
TABLE 6  |   flat Tax Countries and Their Rates
Country Rate
Albania 10%
Bulgaria 10
Czech Republic 15
Estonia 21
Georgia 12
Guernsey 20
Hong Kong 15
Iceland 35.7
Iraq 15
Jamaica 25
Jersey 20
Kazakhstan 10
Kyrgyzstan 10
Latvia 25
Lithuania 27
Macedonia 10
Mauritius 15
Montenegro 15
Mongolia 10
Pridnestrovie 10
Romania 16
Russia 13
Slovakia 19
Ukraine 15
Source: Center for Freedom and Prosperity
Figure 12  |  Tax Cuts attract Capital
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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rates fell in the 1980s. In the 25 years following 
the Reagan tax cuts, net imports of capital in the 
United States from the rest of the world totaled 
$5.25 trillion.27 States can expect the same effect: 
When a state’s tax rates fall, capital owners and 
business leaders from other states and countries 
will want to invest in that state. 
The Laffer Curve
The Laffer Curve shows why lower tax rates re-
sult in greater tax payments by the rich. Arthur 
Laffer’s legendary napkin sketch started a pro-
growth revolution. Tax rates that are too high 
prohibit growth and decrease incentives to work, 
save, and invest. Decreasing marginal tax rates 
increases these incentives and, when this results 
in economic growth, can also increase revenue. 
As the Laffer Curve to the left demonstrates, 
there are two tax rates that will produce the same 
level of revenue. When tax rates are at 100 per-
cent, there is no incentive to work, so no reve-
nues are produced for the government. The curve 
shows that tax rates can be so high they cause 
the government to lose revenue. This holds true 
at both federal and state levels. The ideal tax rate 
is that which produces the most growth, though 
this is often well below the revenue maximizing 
rate. For states, the growth maximizing income 
tax rate is … zero. 
The Laffer Curve does not work only on a 
blackboard. It has also held true in practice. Fig-
ure 14 shows that decreases in tax rates have re-
sulted in increased revenues to the federal govern-
ment; the same results can hold true at the state 
level. In the 1980s, the government’s total tax rev-
enues doubled even as tax rates fell by more than 
half. 
The often maligned Bush tax cuts created jobs 
at a near record pace. Reduced tax rates for em-
ployers and investors created incentives for job 
creation, and businesses responded. Increasing 
tax rates slows the pace job creation. 
After the Bush tax cuts, employment soared. 
Unfortunately, many of these gains have been 
Figure 14  |  Real federal Revenues and the Top Marginal Income Tax Rate
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wiped away by the financial crisis. Another sup-
ply-side stimulus is needed to get employment 
back on track today.
President Obama and the Congress extended 
the Bush tax cuts for another two years in Decem-
ber 2010, but the cuts are scheduled to expire af-
ter 2012. This would be catastrophic for the U.S. 
economy. Taxes as a share of GDP will reach an 
all-time high if tax rates return to what they were 
prior to the Bush cuts. Since federal taxpayers are 
also state taxpayers, the more money Washing-
ton takes from taxpayers, the harder it will be for 
states to balance their budgets.
Do Tax Cuts Hurt the Middle Class?
It is an often repeated myth in the U.S. economy 
that tax cuts benefit only the wealthy while caus-
ing the middle class and poor to fall further be-
hind. In reality, the middle class has made signif-
icant economic gains over the past three decades, 
that is, since tax rates started falling. The hall-
mark of the U.S. economy over the past several de-
cades has been upward economic mobility. Many 
people have moved to higher income classes over 
time, though some have fallen. This upward mo-
bility occurs because the United States is a coun-
try based on opportunity; it needs to remain a na-
tion where people can rise and fall based on their 
work, entrepreneurship, and talent.
Figure 15 tells the real story about America’s 
middle class. The middle class, defined as the 
middle quintile of American families, earns more 
money today than in the 1950s, 70s, or 90s. Those 
considered middle class has changed from those 
making between $33,408 and $44,800 in 1967 to 
those making between $45,021 and $68,304 in 
2005 (in inflation adjusted terms). Middle class 
incomes are not shrinking, but growing. How-
ever, families suffered income losses during the 
2008–2009 recession that may not be recovered 
for years. 
Principle 2: Guard Against Inflation
Inflation kills jobs. This was evident in the 1970s 
when the economy was in the tank and the in-
flation rate skyrocketed. At one point the infla-
tion rate hit 14 percent under President Carter.28 
High inflation rates hurt the states and caused in-
creased costs for the things states buy. State def-
icits rose as inflation rose. States should not be 
advocates of high inflation; they should support 
stable currency policies.
Education and health care are two industries 
largely provided by government, particularly state 
government. These two industries have had near-
ly the highest rates of inflation over the past de-
cade. The third-party payer system in both indus-
tries is one of the biggest reasons for this. A third 
party often pays for health care—whether insur-
ers or government—and for education—through 
government or scholarship programs. This pro-
tects the patient or student from the full cost of 
health care and education. Reducing subsidies for 
health care and education would help prevent the 
inflation these industries continue to suffer, and it 
would be best if the financial resources were giv-
en directly to the payer—the patient or student—
instead of to the provider of care or education. 
This could be done through vouchers or other 
means. Health care and education are two of the 
largest items in state budgets; governors and legis-
lators will have difficulty balancing their budgets 
without reforming these programs. 
Figure 16 shows the inflation rates in educa-
tion, health care, and several other items. It also 
documents the benefits of trade—whether among 
states or between countries: Prices for many con-
sumer items have fallen over the past decade, es-
pecially for those items directly affected by trade. 
Imports lower prices to consumers. Lower prices 
enable consumers to get more for their paychecks, 
thereby increasing their real standard of living. 
Figure 15  | upper and Lower Income Limits for 
Middle Class families (in 2005 dollars)
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service
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Principle 3: Balance the Budget
It is clear that inflation puts extra pressure on 
states’ finances. As mentioned previously, policies 
to address the inflation related to large state ex-
penditures like health care and education will be 
necessary to enable states to keep their budgets in 
check. Government budgets should be lean and 
balanced; this is important for encouraging eco-
nomic growth and should be a primary focus of 
state governments.
The exploding federal budget presents a les-
son to states of what not to do to help their econ-
omies grow. The budget was fairly constrained in 
the 1990s under President Bill Clinton and a Re-
publican controlled Congress. The budget was 
balanced as a result of expenditure controls and 
strong economic growth that generated massive 
revenues for the federal government and the states. 
But over the past decade both parties went on an 
unprecedented spending binge. President Obama 
inherited a $500 billion deficit, and through his 
spending policies, he allowed that budget deficit 
to reach $1.3 trillion. This is not a pretty picture. 
Politicians in Washington talk about an infra-
structure deficit or a shortage of dollars for oth-
er public programs, but the federal budget has 
been growing rapidly for the past decade. Most 
programs have grown at three or four times the 
rate of inflation. It is time for tight lids on federal 
spending and a return to 2007 levels of outlays to 
enable the United States to begin to bring the fed-
eral deficit under control.
Principle 4: More Spending is Not the Answer
One of the most enduring public policy lessons 
every state lawmaker must take to heart is that 
government spending and debt do not create jobs. 
American politicians—in Washington and in the 
states—should pay careful attention to the poli-
cy lessons from the financial turmoil in Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and other big spending Euro-
pean nations. The EU has had to intervene with 
a $1 trillion bailout that grows each month.29 If 
there is any good that can come from this Greek 
calamity, which could spread to other nations in 
Europe, it is that we are witnessing firsthand the 
corrosive consequences of the economic theories 
of John Maynard Keynes.30   
The story is fairly simple: Two years ago, as 
the worldwide economic recession deepened, po-
litical leaders in the United States and Europe 
flocked to the ideas of Mr. Keynes and his dis-
ciples, who advised mountainous government-
spending plans financed by debt to revive flag-
ging economies. The consensus opinion from 
economists at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, Harvard’s faculty, and the 
Obama administration was to ramp up govern-
ment spending to accelerate aggregate demand.31 
They believed Keynesian government spending 
injections would rescue the world economy from 
another Great Depression. 
Princeton economist Alan S. Blinder wrote that 
according to the theory behind this policy pre-
scription, public sector spending causes a “mul-
tiplier effect; that is, output increases by a multi-
ple of the original change in spending that caused 
it.”32 Last year, some economists predicted that ev-
ery dollar of debt funded government spending 
could magically lead to $2 or $3 of new private ac-
tivity. The Obama administration said this when it 
promised 3 million jobs would be “saved or creat-
ed” from its $787 billion stimulus package.33 
To take advantage of the multiplier, countries 
were urged to throw fiscal caution to the wind. 
In its Economic Outlook published in November 
2008, the IMF, which is the international agen-
cy whose mission is to prevent economic pan-
ics, advised member nations like Greece: “There 
is a clear need for additional macroeconomic pol-
icy stimulus relative to what has been announced 
thus far, to support growth and provide a context 
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Figure 16  | Education and Medical Prices 
Skyrocket while Import Prices Drop 
(Percent Change, 2000-2009)
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
24%
70%
44%
50%
-5% -6%
-39%
-76%
al
l i
te
m
s
ed
uc
at
io
n
m
ed
ica
l c
ar
e
en
er
gy
ne
w
 v
eh
icl
es
ap
pa
re
l
so
ftw
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
rs
CHAPTER THREE
44 Rich States, Poor States
to restore health to financial sectors.”34 At its Feb-
ruary 2009, emergency “Group of 20” meetings, 
the IMF economists advised “aggressive” pedal-
to-the-metal government spending “to resolve the 
crisis.”35 The IMF continued that “a key feature 
of a fiscal stimulus program is that it should sup-
port demand for a prolonged period of time and be 
applied broadly across countries” (emphasis add-
ed).36 IMF officials also lectured that the global 
risk was that government borrowing would be 
too small, not too large. 
The United States, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Spain, and almost all OECD countries took that 
advice to heart, but perhaps none more so than 
Greece, which employed Keynesianism on ste-
roids. In 2009, Greek debt as a share of GDP sky-
rocketed to 125 percent of GDP from an already 
high 109 percent in 200837 as the socialist gov-
ernment promised voters more public sector hir-
ing, more generous benefits and more subsidies to 
ailing industries.38
Most of the other nations in Europe that are 
on the potential contamination list—Ireland, It-
aly, Portugal and Spain—also dutifully passed 
textbook Keynesian spending stimulus plans and 
their debt-to-GDP levels also soared. In 2010, Ital-
ian debt hit 118 percent of GDP, and Portuguese 
debt is nearly 90 percent and climbing. Spain’s 
2009 deficit soared to 11 percent of GDP and Ire-
land’s to 14 percent.39 Just what the Keynesian 
doctors ordered.
Now Greece’s unemployment is rising rapid-
ly, output has crashed, and interest rates are ris-
ing as its sovereign debt has been classified as tox-
ic. Keynesian economics has gone haywire. The 
rapid deterioration of Greek debt is a painful but 
useful lesson that debt financing of runaway gov-
ernment spending is anything but free and hardly 
something to worry about, as Lord Keynes him-
self famously put it, only “in the long run” when 
“we are all dead.”40 Instead, what we are witness-
ing in Greece is that runaway government spend-
ing can derail a national economy with the sud-
denness and ferocity of a thunderbolt. Mr. Keynes 
and his disciples never counted on the punishing 
force of modern-day bond vigilantes. 
Now we have an astonishing twist in the sto-
ry. The new “emergency” rescue plan imposed on 
Greece concocted by many of the same economists 
who advised that nation to spend, spend, spend 
just 18 months ago, is centered around “austerity.” 
The IMF and European Union have commanded 
Greece to cut government budgets, slash pensions 
and payrolls, and raise the value-added tax from 
19 percent at the start of the year to 21 or even 
23 percent, to forestall a financial meltdown.41 In 
other words, never mind our earlier counsel to 
run up the credit card; what is needed now is less 
debt and less consumption and demand. Huh? 
The politicians in Greece, all of Europe, and here 
in the United States, can be excused for complain-
ing of policy whiplash from the contradictory ad-
vice they are getting from Keynesian scholars. 
Some of the Keynesians are now seeking—as 
they watch the destructive consequences brought 
on by their own dismal advice of 2008 and 
2009—an abandonment or devaluation of the 
euro so debt deluged countries like Greece can re-
pay or repudiate their sovereign debt. Of course, a 
currency revaluation will only incite inflation, as 
we should have learned in the 1970s, and cause 
rapid acceleration in interest rates on government 
bonds, making this solution self-defeating at best. 
The experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexi-
co should have taught that lesson. 
Keynesians defend their contradictory ad-
vice by explaining that what they meant for coun-
tries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the Unit-
ed States was temporary debt fueled government 
stimulus followed by medium term progress to re-
store balanced budgets. But even if plausible in 
theory, this has always been a fantasy in the real 
world. Giving politicians like Nancy Pelosi and 
Gordon Brown the green light to spend money 
irresponsibly is like giving a pyromaniac a blow 
torch. In Washington, D.C. and European capi-
tals, government spending programs are never 
temporary. 
The U.S. Congress still has not ended stimulus 
programs that date back to the New Deal era of 
the 1930s, and already stimulus plans from 2009 
are being extended. Keynesianism has always 
been an intellectual hoax, an excuse to ratchet 
up the government’s reach and to redistribute in-
come in the here and now, while paying the bills 
later by raising taxes. All under the assumption 
that there are no negative multiplier effects to tax 
increases. 
Keynesianism is also crumbling before our 
very eyes because the promised recovery in jobs in 
the United States and Europe simply has not ma-
terialized. The economic rebound in Europe from 
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colossal government borrowing has only brought 
on a new round of financial turmoil. The coun-
tries with the most debt are getting clobbered in 
global markets as capital flees from them. Japan, 
since 1991, should have been the showcase for the 
Keynesian canard, as the Japanese government 
has unsuccessfully launched at least five “stimu-
lus” plans over the past 20 years while its stock 
market has lost two-thirds of its value. Even the 
Obama administration was forced to concede that 
its stimulus was a failure: agreeing to extend sup-
ply-side tax rate cuts at the end of 2010 was an ad-
mission that stimulus spending had failed. 
The Keynesian response to the observable fail-
ures of its policies is to call for even more stimu-
lus, except, of course, when the stimulus is too 
much—as in Greece. What does the United States 
have to show from its stimulus folly? All of $3 tril-
lion of new debt and no new jobs. 
John Maynard Keynes once famously declared 
that politicians who pursue wrong-headed poli-
cy prescriptions “are usually the slave of some 
defunct economist.”42 The defunct and derailed 
idea of Keynesianism is at the center of the pan-
ic in Europe. It threatens to shift the U.S. econo-
my into a lower gear for years to come. Its appli-
cation has placed governments across the globe in 
deeper levels of debt than they have experienced 
any time since the end of World War II. The glob-
al capital markets won’t tolerate this much longer, 
and even the Keynesians of Europe are recogniz-
ing that reality. But will U.S. politicians in the 
states, cities, and Washington turn away from this 
failed policy?
Conclusion
Increasing spending, bailing out failing firms, in-
creasing tax rates, and printing money have all 
been discredited as ways to create growth or bal-
ance a budget. These fool’s gold tactics and the 
policies of borrowing and spending will work no 
better in state capitals than they did in Washing-
ton. So what has worked in the past to generate 
jobs and prosperity?
Real and sustainable economic growth is gen-
erated by creating incentives for businesses to 
compete and to discover the most efficient ways to 
provide goods and services consumers demand. 
Government subsidies only distort this compet-
itive process. It is neither pro-business nor pro-
growth to give special handouts to one industry 
or another. The principles for prosperity are sim-
ple and timeless: promote economic freedom. Do 
this by keeping taxes low, operating based on a 
lean and efficient budget that neither wastes mon-
ey nor provides unwarranted subsidies, and min-
imizing regulation. States focused on these prin-
ciples will benefit from economic growth and 
prosperity.
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State Rankings
Rank State
1 Utah
2 South Dakota
3 Virginia
4 Wyoming
5 Idaho
6 Colorado
7 North Dakota
8 Tennessee
9 Missouri
10 Florida
11 Georgia
12 Arizona
13 Arkansas
14 Oklahoma
15 Louisiana
16 Indiana
17 Nevada
18 Texas
19 Mississippi
20 Alabama
21 Maryland
22 South Carolina
23 Iowa
24 Massachusetts
25 Michigan
Table 7 |  aLEC-Laffer State Economic Outlook Rankings, 2011  
Based upon equal-weighting of each state’s rank in 15 policy variables
Rank State
26 North Carolina
27 Kansas
28 New Hampshire
29 Alaska
30 Wisconsin
31 West Virginia
32 Nebraska
33 Washington
34 Delaware
35 Connecticut
36 Montana
37 Minnesota
38 Ohio
39 New Mexico
40 Kentucky
41 Pennsylvania
42 Rhode Island
43 Oregon
44 Illinois
45 New Jersey
46 Hawaii
47 California
48 Maine
49 Vermont
50 New York
The Economic Outlook Ranking is a forecast based on a state’s current standing in 15 state policy vari-
ables. Each of these factors is influenced directly by state lawmakers through the legislative process. 
Generally speaking, states that spend less—especially on income transfer programs, and states that tax 
less—particularly on productive activities such as working or investing—experience higher growth 
rates than states which tax and spend more.
The Economic Performance Ranking is a backward-looking measure based on a state’s performance on 
three important variables: Personal Income Per Capita, Absolute Domestic Migration, and Non-Farm 
Payroll Employment—all of which are highly influenced by state policy. This ranking details states’ in-
dividual performances over the past 10 years based on this economic data.
www.alec.org        49
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Rank State
absolute Domestic 
Migration
Personal Income  
Per Capita 
non-farm Payroll  
Employment
1 Wyoming 25 1 1
2 Texas 2 21 7
3 Montana 20 4 8
4 North Dakota 31 2 3
5 New Mexico 23 6 9
6 Virginia 12 15 13
7 Alaska 29 9 2
8 Florida 1 25 15
9 Oklahoma 21 5 17
10 Arkansas 16 11 22
11 South Dakota 27 10 12
12 Hawaii 33 7 11
13 Washington 9 30 14
14 Utah 17 32 5
15 Arizona 3 42 10
16 West Virginia 26 8 21
17 Idaho 13 39 6
18 Nevada 6 49 4
19 Vermont 28 14 24
20 Maine 24 18 29
21 Maryland 41 12 18
22 North Carolina 4 45 23
23 Alabama 14 19 40
24 Colorado 10 44 19
25 South Carolina 7 31 36
26 Nebraska 35 23 16
27 Louisiana 43 3 32
28 Iowa 38 17 25
29 New Hampshire 22 38 20
30 Oregon 11 43 27
31 Kentucky 15 29 38
32 Delaware 18 33 33
33 Georgia 5 48 35
34 Kansas 40 20 28
35 Rhode Island 36 13 43
36 Tennessee 8 41 45
37 Pennsylvania 39 24 31
38 Missouri 19 37 39
39 Mississippi 34 16 46
40 New York 50 22 26
41 Minnesota 37 36 30
42 New Jersey 46 27 34
43 Connecticut 42 26 42
44 Wisconsin 30 40 41
45 Massachusetts 44 28 44
46 California 49 35 37
47 Indiana 32 46 48
48 Illinois 48 34 47
49 Ohio 45 47 49
50 Michigan 47 50 50
Table 8  |  aLEC-Laffer State Economic Performance Rankings, 1999-2009   
absolute Domestic Migration
Cumulative 2000-2009
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2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
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Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.25% 11
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 4.23% 5
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
-$1.51 1
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$14.77 1
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$26.56 31
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$22.86 41
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$1.79 27
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.6% 21
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
607.5 40
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
45.5 47
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.45 41
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
15 16 17
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2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
37 38 22
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
AK
u.S.
AK
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
15.0% Rank:  2
-7,829 Rank: 29
50.0%    Rank: 9 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.40% 43
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$36.39 38
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$7.31 5
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.02 25
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$2.42 25
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 4.8% 2
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
765.2 49
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
56.6 33
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.75 42
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$3.10 49
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      7 Economic Outlook Rank      29
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
-10
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8 AZ
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AZ
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-6
8.9% Rank: 10
731,883 Rank: 3
32.6%    Rank: 42
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.54% 13
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.97% 24
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$10.49 34
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$30.10 23
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$40.89 45
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$13.10 5
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.85 37
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.5% 32
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
463.3 2
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.0 13
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.35 34
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.71 13
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
6 3 3
Economic 
Performance Rank    15 Economic Outlook Rank      12
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2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
11 12 13
8
6
4
2
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-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
aR
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
0.4% Rank: 22
75,358 Rank: 16
48.9%    Rank: 11 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.00% 33
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.50% 20
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$13.82 40
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$15.78 2
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$40.09 43
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.07 12
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.04 16
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 5.6% 4
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
563.6 30
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
48.7 44
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.18 3
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      10 Economic Outlook Rank      13
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
4
2
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CA
u.S.
12
10
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-6
-2.3% Rank: 37
-1,466,917 Rank: 49
34.7%    Rank: 35 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 10.30% 47
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.84% 38
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$36.15 50
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$33.03 31
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$25.73 29
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$15.33 8
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$3.77 46
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.5% 31
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
496.6 7
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
47.2 46
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.00 43
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
2.68 46
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
42 43 46
Economic 
Performance Rank      46 Economic Outlook Rank      47
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2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
9 2 2
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
CO
u.S.
CO
u.S.
2.6% Rank: 19
203,700 Rank: 10
30.8%    Rank: 44
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.63% 14
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 4.63% 6
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$28.98 19
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.86 28
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$11.83 3
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.93 38
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 11.1% 46
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
549.0 26
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.8 8
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.36 36
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.39 4
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
3 1
Economic 
Performance Rank    24 Economic Outlook Rank      6
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
CT
u.S.
CT
u.S.
10
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-3.8% Rank: 42
-100,055 Rank: 42
39.6%    Rank: 26 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.50% 27
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.50% 26
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$2.67 18
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$41.66 42
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.74 11
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$15.61 10
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$1.00 39
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.1% 15
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
531.1 16
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
62.1 24
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.25 46
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.55 45
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
40 32 36
Economic 
Performance Rank      43 Economic Outlook Rank      35
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
31 31 37
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
DE
u.S.
DE
u.S.
8
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2
0
-2
-4
-1.7% Rank: 33
46,411 Rank: 18
35.1%    Rank: 33 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.20% 42
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.98% 47
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$11.34 35
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.15 4
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.00 1
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.64 49
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$9.38 49
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.2% 36
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
548.5 25
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
77.2 1
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.85 17
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      32 Economic Outlook Rank      34
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
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fL
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3.9% Rank: 15
1,281,521 Rank: 1
40.1%    Rank: 25 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.50% 13
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$41.28 41
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.18 39
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.22 43
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$0.86 32
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.0% 27
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
476.1 5
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
53.9 41
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.70 11
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
16 11 5
8 Economic Outlook Rank      10
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
8 8 9
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-2.0% Rank: 35
569,651 Rank: 5
24.0%    Rank: 48
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.00% 25
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.00% 16
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$6.53 26
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$30.25 24
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$28.92 36
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$11.31 2
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.82 18
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 5.7% 5
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
538.7 20
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
60.9 27
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.08 27
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      33 Economic Outlook Rank      11
Georgia    
0
30
60
90
120
150
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
absolute Domestic Migration
Cumulative 2000-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
60 Rich States, Poor States
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
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8.6% Rank: 11
-29,113 Rank: 33
50.7%    Rank: 7 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 11.00% 48
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.40% 19
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$13.22 38
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$23.23 10
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$48.56 49
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$22.47 40
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$3.48 45
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.4% 38
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
582.5 35
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
56.4 35
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.70 11
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
41 41 39
Economic 
Performance Rank      12 Economic Outlook Rank      46
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
10 14 7
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u.S.
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2
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-4
-6
10.7% Rank: 6
114,914 Rank: 13
33.4%    Rank: 39 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.80% 38
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.60% 27
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$14.17 41
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$23.56 11
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$26.90 33
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$15.45 9
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.73 5
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 5.4% 3
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
509.9 11
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
63.9 18
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.98 22
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      17 5
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
4
2
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-6
IL
u.S.
IL
u.S.
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-7.0% Rank: 47
-652,205 Rank: 48
34.8%    Rank: 34 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.00% 17
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.50% 44
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.80 16
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$38.91 39
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.01 10
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.78 45
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.08 14
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.8% 42
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
497.8 9
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
47.9 45
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.25 46
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$3.05 48
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
43 44 47
Economic 
Performance Rank      48 Economic Outlook Rank      44
Illinois    
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
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Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
12 17 20
4
2
0
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-4
-6
-8
In
u.S.
In
u.S.
-7.7% Rank: 48
-25,006 Rank: 32
28.7%    Rank: 46 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.30% 12
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.50% 34
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.57 15
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.58 29
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$26.13 30
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.13 27
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$1.65 29
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.8% 26
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
537.9 19
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
69.9 3
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.16 2
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      47 Economic Outlook Rank      16
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
Ia
u.S.
Ia
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
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-4
-0.5% Rank: 25
-51,500 Rank: 38
44.4%    Rank: 17
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.84% 23
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.90% 46
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$12.39 36
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$33.27 32
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.75 20
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.54 30
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.72 19
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.4% 10
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
596.8 39
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
69.4 5
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.82 15
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
25 35 28
Economic 
Performance Rank      28 Economic Outlook Rank      23
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
29 24 25
KS
u.S.
KS
u.S.
-0.6% Rank: 28
-68,529 Rank: 40
43.0%    Rank: 20
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.45% 26
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.05% 25
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$16.51 44
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$33.83 33
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$28.07 35
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$13.13 6
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$2.06 26
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.4% 30
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
717.4 48
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
64.6 14
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.55 8
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      34 Economic Outlook Rank      27
Kansas    
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1010
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
33
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
absolute Domestic Migration
Cumulative 2000-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
66 Rich States, Poor States
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
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KY
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KY
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-2.5% Rank: 38
81,665 Rank: 15
38.6%    Rank: 29 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.20% 41
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.20% 31
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$5.38 21
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$20.41 7
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.11 17
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.53 39
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.34 21
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 11.8% 48
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
561.3 29
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
54.4 40
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.29 36
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
44 36 40
Economic 
Performance Rank      31 Economic Outlook Rank      40
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
24 18 16
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
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La
u.S.
15
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-6
-1.1% Rank: 32
-307,220 Rank: 43
63.6%    Rank: 3
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 3.90% 10
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.20% 11
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$8.35 29
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.32 6
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$43.37 47
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.34 22
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.72 6
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.8% 35
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
616.4 41
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
39.6 49
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.06 26
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      27 Economic Outlook Rank      15
Louisiana    
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
8
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2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
ME
u.S.
ME
u.S.
-0.7% Rank: 29
26,536 Rank: 24
44.4%    Rank: 18 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.50% 43
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.93% 39
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$23.31 47
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$45.46 45
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$22.35 22
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$20.22 36
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$0.15 35
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.0% 8
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
546.1 24
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.2 12
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.50 40
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.52 43
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
46 47 44
Economic 
Performance Rank      20 Economic Outlook Rank      48
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
28 28 29
MD
u.S.
MD
u.S.
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3.2% Rank: 18
-96,512 Rank: 41
47.3%    Rank: 12 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.55% 44
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.25% 32
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$5.78 22
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.49 13
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$13.89 8
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.60 32
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.06 15
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.0% 7
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
528.3 15
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
63.2 20
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.63 9
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      21 Economic Outlook Rank      21
Maryland    
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-6
-4
-2
0
2
44
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
absolute Domestic Migration
Cumulative 2000-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
70 Rich States, Poor States
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
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u.S.
Ma
u.S.
12
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-3.9% Rank: 44
-322,183 Rank: 44
39.2%    Rank: 28 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.30% 20
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.25% 32
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$3.11 19
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$35.33 35
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$12.41 6
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$10.70 1
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$2.04 41
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 13.7% 50
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
493.4 6
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.6 9
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.00 43
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.54 7
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
22 26 32
Economic 
Performance Rank      45 Economic Outlook Rank      24
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
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Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
17 34 26
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
MI
u.S.
MI
u.S.
-16.5% Rank: 50
-555,675 Rank: 47
21.2%    Rank: 50
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.85% 30
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.01% 42
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$2.09 17
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$40.39 40
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$23.52 24
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.42 14
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.54 8
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.8% 34
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
475.3 4
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
59.5 30
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.40 37
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.12 28
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      50 Economic Outlook Rank      25
Michigan    
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
Mn
u.S.
Mn
u.S.
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-0.9% Rank: 30
-51,067 Rank: 37
34.6%    Rank: 36 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.85% 39
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.80% 45
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$9.17 31
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.84 22
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.00 16
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$20.53 37
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.96 17
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.2% 17
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
535.0 18
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.3 11
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.27 35
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
39 40 38
Economic 
Performance Rank      41 Economic Outlook Rank      37
Minnesota    
-14
-10
-6
-2
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
19 19 18
MS
u.S.
MS
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-5.9% Rank: 46
-36,266 Rank: 34
45.5%    Rank: 16 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.00% 17
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.00% 7
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$7.53 28
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$25.79 16
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$35.16 42
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.69 23
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$1.46 30
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 5.9% 6
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
655.9 46
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
40.0 48
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.96 20
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      39 Economic Outlook Rank      19
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
MO
u.S.
MO
u.S.
-2.9% Rank: 39
39,000 Rank: 19
34.2%    Rank: 37 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.00% 32
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.81% 15
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.28 14
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$25.59 15
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$23.60 25
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$15.83 11
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.95 4
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.8% 41
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
542.3 22
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
56.1 37
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.90 18
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
3 1
25 23 15
38 Economic Performance Rank Economic Outlook Rank      9
Missouri    
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Performance Rank      
32 30 33
MT
u.S.
MT
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
10.2% Rank: 8
38,910 Rank: 20
55.7%    Rank: 4 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.90% 31
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.75% 22
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$6.09 23
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$35.10 34
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.00 1
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$26.61 46
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$5.19 2
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.2% 28
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
580.8 34
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
52.4 43
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.35 34
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$3.33 50
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
3 Economic Outlook Rank      36
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
nE
u.S.
nE
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
3.6% Rank: 16
-39,157 Rank: 35
41.5%    Rank: 23 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.84% 29
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.81% 29
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$16.74 45
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$35.40 36
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$26.72 32
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.75 19
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.49 9
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.8% 25
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
656.6 47
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
69.7 4
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.97 21
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
34 29 34
Economic 
Performance Rank      26 Economic Outlook Rank      32
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
7 7 11
8
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4
2
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-4
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-12
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u.S.
nV
u.S.
12
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-6
-8
12.4% Rank: 4
376,380 Rank: 6
23.6%    Rank: 49
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$30.48 25
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.97 40
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$36.51 50
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$3.08 44
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.2% 37
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
436.5 1
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
59.8 28
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.25 46
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.13 30
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      18 Economic Outlook Rank      17
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
nh
u.S.
nh
u.S.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1.7% Rank: 20
30,858 Rank: 22
34.2%    Rank: 38 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.50% 34
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$53.38 50
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.00 1
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.80 34
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$1.36 31
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 10.0% 43
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
541.0 21
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
64.2 16
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.45 41
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
26 37 30
Economic 
Performance Rank      29 Economic Outlook Rank      28
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
48 46 48
nJ
u.S.
nJ
u.S.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-1.8% Rank: 34
-464,111 Rank: 46
39.4%    Rank: 27
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.97% 46
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.00% 40
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$24.81 48
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$51.22 49
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$20.11 15
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$14.50 7
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$1.70 28
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.7% 13
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
578.7 33
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
57.8 32
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.53 44
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank    42 Economic Outlook Rank      45
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
nM
u.S.
nM
u.S.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
9.8% Rank: 9
30,038 Rank: 23
53.6%    Rank: 6 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.90% 16
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.60% 27
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$9.84 32
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.21 5
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$42.35 46
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$17.79 24
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$1.76 40
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.2% 16
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
645.7 45
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
53.9 41
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.50 40
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.91 19
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
27 25 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      5 Economic Outlook Rank      39
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
49 50 50
nY
u.S.
nY
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-0.5% Rank: 26
-1,676,842 Rank: 50
42.6%    Rank: 22 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 12.62% 50
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 15.95% 50
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$12.71 37
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$41.88 43
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.69 27
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.65 33
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$14.26 50
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.7% 33
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
640.8 43
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
62.5 23
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.34 38
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank    40 Economic Outlook Rank      50
New York    
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
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0.3% Rank: 23
647,229 Rank: 4
30.4%    Rank: 45
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.75% 36
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.90% 23
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$9.87 33
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.25 12
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$22.26 21
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.83 20
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$2.60 43
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.0% 14
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
593.6 38
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
64.0 17
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.12 28
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
21 21 21
Economic 
Performance Rank      22 Economic Outlook Rank      26
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Performance Rank      
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
18 13 12
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nD
u.S.
20
15
10
5
0
-5
12.5% Rank: 3
-18,632 Rank: 31
69.5%    Rank: 2 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 4.86% 15
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 4.16% 4
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$8.91 30
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.16 20
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.52 26
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.32 38
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$13.84 1
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.7% 23
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
644.0 44
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
71.1 2
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.02 1
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
4 7
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
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-10.7% Rank: 49
-388,043 Rank: 45
28.1%    Rank: 47 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.93% 40
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.14% 10
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$14.53 42
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$32.94 30
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$23.12 23
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.52 29
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$0.84 33
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.2% 18
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
533.9 17
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
59.7 29
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.40 37
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.24 34
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
47 45 42
Economic 
Performance Rank      49 Economic Outlook Rank      38
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
14 15 14
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3.3% Rank: 17
38,602 Rank: 21
53.7%    Rank: 5 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.50% 21
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.00% 16
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$6.94 27
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.21 3
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$27.72 34
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.92 21
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.32 22
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.3% 9
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
590.5 37
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
59.0 31
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.87 47
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      9 Economic Outlook Rank      14
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
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-0.6% Rank: 27
177,312 Rank: 11
30.9%    Rank: 43 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 11.00% 48
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 11.25% 48
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$13.37 39
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.04 28
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$0.00 1
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.91 35
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$8.08 48
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.7% 40
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
519.4 14
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
63.0 21
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.50 49
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.69 10
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
2 4
35 39 41
Economic 
Performance Rank      30 Economic Outlook Rank      43
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
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Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
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3
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-5
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-1.0% Rank: 31
-52,850 Rank: 39
40.5%    Rank: 24 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.05% 35
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 13.97% 49
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$31.02 27
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.35 12
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.02 42
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$2.15 42
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 9.6% 39
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
472.7 3
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
56.6 33
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.32 37
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      37 Economic Outlook Rank      41
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
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-3.8% Rank: 43
-45,174 Rank: 36
47.1%    Rank: 13 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.99% 24
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 9.00% 40
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$26.36 49
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$47.79 46
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.49 13
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.60 17
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.13 23
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 10.5% 45
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
497.0 8
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
55.2 38
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.40 37
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.02 23
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
45 48 45
Economic 
Performance Rank      35 Economic Outlook Rank      42
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
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Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
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-2.2% Rank: 36
309,032 Rank: 7
35.8%    Rank: 31 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.00% 33
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.00% 7
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$6.21 24
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.44 21
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.73 19
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.61 18
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$3.68 20
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 12.1% 49
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
557.9 28
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
55.1 39
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.38 39
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      25 Economic Outlook Rank      22
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Economic 
Outlook Rank      
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
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7.3% Rank: 12
6,361 Rank: 27
49.9%    Rank: 10 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$27.88 18
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$32.57 41
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.11 26
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.27 12
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 8.3% 29
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
589.7 36
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
65.6 9
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.02 23
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
2 5 4
Economic 
Performance Rank      11 2
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
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Historical Ranking Comparison
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-4.3% Rank: 45
269,273 Rank: 8
32.7%    Rank: 41
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.50% 20
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.55 8
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$40.59 44
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.55 16
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$2.71 24
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.6% 22
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
516.9 12
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
63.7 19
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.19 31
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      36 8
Tennessee    
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
TX
u.S.
TX
u.S.
10
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2
0
-2
-4
-6
10.5% Rank: 7
867,273 Rank: 2
42.8%    Rank: 21
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.56% 14
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$36.06 37
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.11 37
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.47 28
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.57 7
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 11.1% 47
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
570.4 32
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
56.3 36
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.38 39
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Outlook Rank      18
13 10 19
Economic 
Performance Rank      2
Texas    
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Cumulative 2000-2009
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
1 1 1
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11.8% Rank: 5
55,799 Rank: 17
35.2%    Rank: 32 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.00% 17
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.00% 7
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$25.31 14
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.82 38
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.47 15
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.12 13
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.3% 19
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
503.0 10
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
67.8 7
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.46 6
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
Economic 
Performance Rank      14 1
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
VT
u.S.
VT
u.S.
10
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0
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0.2% Rank: 24
-2,990 Rank: 28
46.8%    Rank: 14 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 8.95% 45
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.50% 34
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$21.26 46
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$48.92 47
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$14.31 9
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.15 47
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$0.78 34
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.5% 20
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
618.4 42
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
61.6 25
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.15 45
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.22 33
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
50 49 49
Economic 
Performance Rank      19 Economic Outlook Rank      49
Vermont    
-2.0
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-1.0
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0.0
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absolute Domestic Migration
Cumulative 2000-2009
www.alec.org        95
2011 ALEC-LAFFER STATE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic 
Performance Rank      
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
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4.4% Rank: 13
175,430 Rank: 12
46.2%    Rank: 15 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 5.75% 22
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.00% 16
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$6.45 25
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$30.78 26
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$13.79 7
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$18.68 31
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.46 10
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.4% 11
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
564.1 31
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
68.1 6
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.39 4
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
6 3
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
2008 2009 2010
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
4
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Wa
u.S.
Wa
u.S.
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5
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-5
4.0% Rank: 14
234,730 Rank: 9
36.2%    Rank: 30
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 5.22% 12
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$27.71 17
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$48.73 50
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$24.70 44
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? Yes 50
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$0.07 36
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 10.1% 44
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
544.7 23
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
61.6 25
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$8.67 50
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.04 25
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
3 1
30 22 24
Economic 
Performance Rank      13 Economic Outlook Rank      33
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Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
non-farm Payroll Employment
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
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3
2
1
0
-1
2
-3
-4
-5
WV
u.S.
WV
u.S.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
0.8% Rank: 21
16,590 Rank: 26
50.6%    Rank: 8 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 6.50% 27
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 8.50% 34
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$15.53 43
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$22.26 9
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$19.96 14
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$29.97 48
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$5.06 3
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 6.6% 12
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
557.0 27
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
35.1 50
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.84 16
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
Economic 
Performance Rank      16 Economic Outlook Rank      31
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Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
(in thousands)
8
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2008 2009 2010
WI
u.S.
-18,365 Rank: 30
33.2%    Rank: 40 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 7.75% 36
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 7.90% 30
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$3.67 20
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$41.96 44
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$21.70 18
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$16.38 13
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
$4.16 47
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 7.7% 24
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
517.6 13
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
62.8 22
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$2.21 32
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
No 50
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
1 13
33 27 23
Economic 
Performance Rank      44 Economic Outlook Rank      30
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1
Personal Income Per Capita
Cumulative Growth 1999-2009
Economic Performance Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A historical measure based on a state’s performance 
(equally weighted average) in the three important per-
formance variables shown below. These variables are 
highly influenced by state policy.
Economic Outlook Rank (1=best  50=worst)
A forecast based on a state’s standing (equally weighted 
average) in the 15 important state policy variables shown 
below. Data reflect state + local rates and revenues and 
any effect of federal deductibility.
(in thousands)
Historical Ranking Comparison
ECOnOMIC OuTLOOK RanK 
2008 2009 2010
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
‛00 ‛01 ‛02 ‛03 ‛04 ‛05 ‛06 ‛07 ‛08 ‛09
Economic 
Performance Rank      
Economic 
Outlook Rank      
4 6 6
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22,235 Rank: 25
70.7%    Rank: 1 
Variable Data Rank
Top Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Top Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rate 0.00% 1
Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
(change in tax liability per $1,000 of income)
$0.00 2
Property Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$49.20 48
Sales Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$47.50 48
Remaining Tax Burden
(per $1,000 of personal income)
$12.61 4
Estate/Inheritance Tax Levied? No 1
Recently Legislated Tax Changes
(2009 & 2010, per $1,000 of personal income)
-$4.34 11
Debt Service as a Share of Tax Revenue 2.8% 1
Public Employees Per 10,000 
of Population (full-time equivalent)
948.9 50
State Liability System Survey
(tort litigation treatment, judicial impartiality, 
etc.)
64.5 15
State Minimum Wage
(federal floor is $7.25)
$7.25 1
Average Workers’ Compensation Costs
(per $100 of payroll)
$1.79 14
Right-to-Work State?
(option to join or support a union)
Yes 1
Number of Tax Expenditure Limits
(0= least/worst   3=most/best)
0 35
4
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Earlier in this book, we introduced 15 policy variables that have a proven impact on the migration of capital—both investment and human—into and out of states. The end result of an equally weighted combination of these variables is the 2011 ALEC-Laffer Economic Outlook rankings 
of the states. Each of these factors is influenced directly by state lawmakers through the legislative 
process. The 15 factors and a basic description of their purposes, sourcing, and subsequent calculation 
methodologies are as follows:
hIGhEST MaRGInaL PERSOnaL InCOME TaX RaTE
This ranking includes local taxes, if any, and any impact of federal deductibility, if allowed. A state’s 
largest city was used as a proxy for local tax rates. Data was drawn from: CCH Tax Research Network, 
Tax Analysts, and Tax Administrators.
hIGhEST MaRGInaL CORPORaTE InCOME TaX RaTE
This variable includes local taxes, if any, and includes the effect of federal deductibility, if allowed. A 
state’s largest city was used as a proxy for local tax rates. In the case of gross receipts or business franchise 
taxes, an effective tax rate was approximated, when possible, using NIPA profits and gross domestic 
product data. Data was drawn from: CCH Tax Research Network, Tax Analysts, Tax Administrators, 
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
PERSOnaL InCOME TaX PROGRESSIVITY
This variable was measured as the difference between the average tax liability per $1,000 at incomes 
of $150,000 and $50,000. The tax liabilities were measured using a combination of effective tax 
rates, exemptions, and deductions at both state and federal levels, which are calculations from Laffer 
Associates.
PROPERTY TaX BuRDEn
This variable was calculated by taking tax revenues from property taxes per $1,000 of personal income. 
We have used U.S. Census Bureau data, for which the most recent year available is 2008. This data was 
released in July 2010.
SaLES TaX BuRDEn
This variable was calculated by taking tax revenues from sales taxes per $1,000 of personal income. 
Sales taxes taken into consideration include the general sales tax and specific sales taxes. We have used 
U.S. Census Bureau Data, for which the most recent year available is 2008. This data was released in 
July 2010.
REMaInInG TaX BuRDEn 
This variable was calculated by taking tax revenues from all taxes—excluding personal income, 
Appendix
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corporate income (including corporate license), property, sales, and severance per $1,000 of personal 
income. We used U.S. Census Bureau Data, for which the most recent year available is 2008. Data was 
released in July 2010.
ESTaTE OR InhERITanCE TaX (YES OR nO)
This variable assesses if a state levies an estate or inheritance tax. We chose to score states based on 
either a “yes” for the presence of a state-level estate or inheritance tax, or a “no” for the lack thereof. 
Data was drawn from: American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, “2009 Death Tax Chart: Update 
January 2010.”
RECEnTLY LEGISLaTED TaX ChanGES
This variable calculates each state’s relative change in tax burden over a two year period, (in this case, 
2009 and 2010), using static revenue estimates of legislated tax changes per $1000 of personal income. 
This time frame ensures that tax changes will impact a state’s ranking long enough to overcome any 
lags in the tax revenue data. Laffer Associates calculations used raw data from Tax Analysts and other 
sources.
DEBT SERVICE aS a ShaRE Of TaX REVEnuE 
Interest paid on debt as a percentage of total tax revenue. This information comes from U.S. Census 
Bureau data.
PuBLIC EMPLOYEES PER 10,000 RESIDEnTS
This variable shows the full-time Equivalent Public Employment per 10,000 of Population. This 
information comes from U.S. Census Bureau data.
QuaLITY Of STaTE LEGaL SYSTEM
This variable ranks tort systems by state. Information comes from the 2010 U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
State Liability Systems Ranking.
STaTE MInIMuM WaGE
Minimum wage enforced on a state-by-state basis. If a state does not have a minimum wage, we use 
the federal minimum wage floor. This information comes from the U.S. Department of Labor, as of 
December 2010.
WORKERS’ COMPEnSaTIOn COSTS
This variable highlights the 2010 Workers’ Compensation Index Rate (cost per $100 of payroll). Note: 
This survey is conducted by the Information Management Division, Department of Consumer & 
Business Services.
RIGhT-TO-WORK STaTE (YES OR nO)
This variable assesses whether or not a state requires union membership out of its employees. We have 
chosen to score states based on either a “yes” for the presence of a right-to-work law, or a “no” for the 
lack thereof. This information comes from the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education 
Foundation, Inc.
TaX OR EXPEnDITuRE LIMIT
States were ranked by the number of state tax or expenditure limits in place. We measure this by i) a tax 
expenditure limit, ii) mandatory voter approval of tax increases, and iii) a supermajority requirement 
for tax increases. This information comes from the Cato Institute and other sources.
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APPENDIX
CIVIL JuSTICE
To promote systematic fairness in the courts 
by discouraging frivolous lawsuits, to fairly 
balance judicial and legislative authority, to treat 
defendants and plaintiffs in a consistent manner, 
and to install transparency and accountability in 
the trial system.
COMMERCE, InSuRanCE, 
anD ECOnOMIC DEVELOPMEnT
To enhance economic competitiveness, to 
promote employment and economic prosperity, 
to encourage innovation, and to limit government 
regulation imposed upon business.
EnERGY, EnVIROnMEnT anD aGRICuLTuRE
To promote the mutually beneficial link between 
a robust economy and a healthy environment, 
and seeks to enhance the quality and use of our 
natural and agricultural resources for the benefit 
of human health and wellbeing.
EDuCaTIOn
To promote excellence in the nation’s educational 
system, to advance reforms through parental 
choice, to support efficiency, accountability, and 
transparency in all educational institutions, and to 
ensure America’s youth are given the opportunity 
to succeed.
hEaLTh anD huMan SERVICES
To reduce governmental involvement in health 
care, to support a consumer-driven health care 
system, and to promote free-market, pro-patient 
health care reforms at the state level.
InTERnaTIOnaL RELaTIOnS
To promote the core ALEC principles of free 
markets and limited government beyond our 
shores, to support final ratification of free trade 
agreements that create American jobs and grow 
our economy, and to protect the intellectual 
property rights of U.S. companies doing business 
overseas.
PuBLIC SafETY anD ELECTIOnS
To develop model policies that reduce crime 
and violence in our cities and neighborhoods, 
while also developing policies to ensure integrity 
and efficiency in our elections and systems of 
government.
TaX anD fISCaL POLICY 
To reduce excessive government spending, 
to lower the overall tax burden, to enhance 
transparency of government operations, and to 
develop sound, free-market tax and fiscal policy.
TELECOMMunICaTIOnS anD InfORMaTIOn
TEChnOLOGY
To advance consumer choice and deployment of 
new technologies in the dynamic and converging 
areas of telecommunications and information 
technology by furthering public policies that 
preserve free-market principles, promote 
competitive federalism, uphold deregulation 
efforts, and keep industries free from new 
burdensome regulations.
About the American Legislative Exchange Council
Founded in 1973, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is the nation’s largest, 
nonpartisan, individual membership association of state legislators, with 2,000 legislative members 
across the nation. ALEC’s mission is to discuss, develop, and disseminate public policies, which expand 
free markets, promote economic growth, limit the size of government, and preserve individual liberty 
within its nine Task Forces.
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“ThedataandanalysisfromALEConstateeconomicconditionsisapowerfulresourcefor
policymakerswhocareaboutreducingspendingsotheycanbeginreducingtaxes.It’sbothareport
cardandascorecard.Frankly,Ohio’snotdoingaswellasitneedstodo.TheinformationthatALEC
provideshelpsusunderstandourcompetitivepositionandhelpsspurustodobetter.”
 
 Ohio Governor John Kasich
“OnemajorlessonfrommyyearsincorporateAmericaisthatwhereyoudobusinessreallymakesa
difference.Thebeststategovernmentsrealizethattheircitizensaremakingthosecalculationsall
thetime.Rich States, Poor Statesisagreattoolforthoselawmakersintentuponincreasingstate
economiccompetitivenessandprosperity.”
 Florida Governor Rick Scott
 
“TheGreatRecessionhastakenacorrespondinglygreattollonstatebudgets.Yet,statesthathave
putinplacethestrongestpro-growtheconomicpolicieshavebeenabletoweatherthestormmuch
betterthanstateswiththehighesttaxes,highestgovernmentspending,andmostburdensome
regulation.YearafteryearRich States, Poor Statesputsforthcompellingnewanecdotes,dataand
theoriestobackupthecommonsenseeconomicpoliciesTennesseecontinuestocountonforlong-
termeconomicgrowth.”
 
 Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam
